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1. Background and Overview
There is now substantial experience around the world with partial or complete shifis from
government pension systems to private finded plans. Although there are important common features
of all such transitions, each country that makes such a transition faces a unique problem, reflecting
the demographic and economic situation of that country and the promises and expectations embedded
in existing law. 1
In the United States, the actuarial projection that the Social Security trust find will be
depleted by the year 2030 has fostered interest in options to shifi from the pay-as-you-go system to
a finded or privatized system, z The very low implicit rate of return earned on contributions in the
existing pay-as-you-go system and the adverse effect of the ufinded program on national saving
have also encouraged consideration of the possibility of shifiing to a partially or filly funded system
1See for example World Bank (1994) and the papers in this NBER volume describing the
experience in Argentina, Australia, Chile, Great Britain and Mexico.
2See the alternative proposals in the Report of the Quadrennial Social Security Advisory
Council, (forthcoming 1996).
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The current paper shows that shifting to a finded system would permit the existing 12.4
percent payroll tax to be replaced in the long run by a payroll tax of about two percent because a
finded system has so much higher a rate of return than the implicit rate of return in a pay-as-you-go
unfinded Social Security program. This reduction in the payroll tax results in a reduction in the
deadweight loss that is itself equal to about two percent of payroll. Thus the long-run gain from
shifiing to a finded system is almost as large as the entire twelve percent payroll tax. This is
equivalent to a permanent increase in real income of about five percent of GDP.
A major concern in all discussions of privatizing Social Security is the transition path. Critics
of privatization argue that the current and projected conditions in the United States -- a population
that is groting slowly and aging rapidly, a low rate of economic growth, and a very generous level
of promised benefits -- make the transition from the existing utinded system to individual finded
accounts too costly to be politically acceptable. Current employees now pay a twelve percent payroll
tax to finance the benefits of current retirees. In the transition to a finded system these employees
would have to pay this plus the contributions to find their own fiture benefits. Critics argue that this
combination would be too onerous to be acceptable and even those who favor a finded system in
principle may fear that they are correct.
The purpose of the current paper is to examine the basic issues involved in a transition and
to explore alternative feasible transition paths from the existing U.S. pay-as-you-go Social Security
system to a program of finded Mandatory Individual Retirement Accounts (MIRAs), The transition
plans that we study are constrained to provide the same level of benefits in each fiture year as retirees
3See for exampleFeldstein(1996) and Kotlikoff (1996).
Sstran,909 2would receive from the existing Social Security system, In addition, the financing leaves the
projected path of the Social Security trust find unchanged, thus guaranteeing that any additional
private saving that results from the Mandatory Individual Retirement Accounts is a net addition to
the nation’s capital stock.
An important finding in our analysis is that the additional payments that are required in the
early years of the transition are small relative to the existing payroll tax and to the long-inn gains from
privatization, These additional payments during the early part of the transition can be anywhere from
one percent of payroll to three percent of payroll. Younger workers at the time of the transition are
net beneficiaries over their own lifetimes. Although the gains of the older workers are not large
enough to compensate them for the higher costs in the early years of the transition, when we look at
nuclear ftilies of parents and their children we see that a substantial majority of two generation pairs
are likely to be net gainers. More generally, the gains occur quickly enough and are large enough that
the present value of the annual net changes over the first fifiy years are positive for any reasonable
discount rate.
A basic problem in analyzing alternatives to the current system is that the benefits “promised’
in current law are inconsistent with the current level of taxes. The Social Security actuaries predict
that the existing trust find will be exhausted by about the year 2030, a date that has been advanced
repeatedly during the past decade. We therefore cannot sensibly compare alternative transition paths
to the tax and benefit schedules in current law but must make some assumption about how the
system would be kept solvent if it were not privatized. Most of our simulations make the simple
assumption that the current system would keep the existing 12.4 percent tax rate for the Old Age,
Survivors and Disability Insurance program but would cut benefits when the trust find is exhausted.
Sstran,909 3We refer to all of these feasible benefit paths as the baseline benefit ~aths to distinguish them from
the current law benefit r)ath. We also simulate a proposal to maintain the benefit rules embodied in
current law by raising the tax rate after 2030 to the level required to meet the resulting benefit
obligations,
One final comment of introduction is needed about our use of the term “privatize.” We are
analyzing the transition to a system of Mandatory Individual Retirement Accounts, similar to current
IRAs and 401 k’s, to which employers and/or employees would be required to make contributions
that would then be invested in stocks and bonds, There are two aspects of this that should be
emphasized. First, participation is not voluntary. Everyone must participate and thus provide for his
or her retirement.4 Second, while the finds could in principle be collected and invested by the
government, we believe that there are many reasons for preferring a decentralized system in which
individuals and/or employers choose private find managers. For this reason we refer to the proposed
alternatives as “privatizing” Social Security.
To motivate interest in the problem of transition, this paper begins (section 2) by indicating
in more detail the potential steady state benefit of substituting a finded Mandatory Individual
4The individual’s decision to shifi from the existing pay-as-you-go Social Security system
to the system of individual investment accounts could be made volunta~, Since our analysis
assumes that individuals receive a fill credit against their payroll tax liability for contributions to
the finded retirement accounts, the incentive for individuals to voluntarily shifi would be
extremely strong. But although the choice between the current system and the finded alternative
could be made voluntary, individuals are required to participate in one of the two,
There are two obvious alternatives to a mandatory system: a voluntary system coupled
with either a means tested benefit or with a uniform flat rate benefit, A means tested system runs
the risks of discouraging savings if the level of benefits is set high enough or of leaving
undesirable poverty if it is set too low; see Feldstein (1987). A flat rate benefit may also
discourage private saving and may require a high tax rate with a correspondingly high deadweight
loss,
Sslran.909 4Retirement Account program for the existing U.S. pay-as-you-go Social Security system. The
remaining sections of the paper present our simulations and analyses of a variety of feasible transition
paths for the U.S. Social Security system.
Section 3 provides some simple calculations to show the order of magnitude of the extra taxes
required during the transition to a finded system that maintains a feasible baseline benefit path,
Section 4 then describes our Social Security Simulation Model (SS-SIM) and discusses the
parameter values that we have used. Section 5 presents results for the simulation of a gradual
transition to a pnvatized system for all employees. Section 6 deals with the distributional issue of the
benefits for lower income individuals in a privatized system. Section 7 discusses the problem that the
returns on privately invested finds are uncertain and that actuarially fair annuities based on debt and
equity returns are not available,
In section 8 we analyze an alternative baseline in which the annual irdlation-adjustment to
Social Security benefits would be reduced by one percentage point. In section 9 we turn in the
opposite direction and consider a transition to a privatized system that maintains the current law
benefit Dath, Instead of requiring a rise in the payroll tax from 12.4 percent to more than 19 percent,
the filly finded system can maintain benefits with a long-run contribution rate of only slightly more
than 3 percent. We present the corresponding transition path.
A final section summarizes our findings and comments on some issues that remain to be
analyzed.
Sstran.909 52. The Steady State Advantage of a Funded Retirement Programs
In a growing economy with an unchanging age structure, an unfinded pay-as-you-go
(PAYGO) Social Security retirement system that is financed by a constant payroll tax rate provides
each cohort of participants with an implicit real rate of return on their tax contributions equal to the
aggregate rate of growth of the economy (Samuel son, 1958). For the current illustrative calculation,
we take this rate of return to be 2.5 percent, the rate of growth of real wage and salary payments
between 1960 and 1995 (Economic RerYortof the President, 1996).’
h contrast, finds that are saved and invested in the nation’s capital stock earn a real rate of
return for the nation that is equal to the pretax marginal product of capital. For the past 35 years, this
has averaged slightly more than 9,0 percent.’ We now assume that the individual can in principle
receive the entire 9 percent in a finded account; we return below to defend the reasonableness of this
assumption.
To see the importance of the difference between the 2.5 percent and 9 percent rates of return
for the required amount of retirement saving, consider the very simple example of an individual who
saves at one point during the middle of his working life for consumption during the middle of his
5The steady state gain of a funded program must be balanced against the costs of
transition. Realistic estimates of these costs are the primary focus of this paper. We present
calculations that show that the present value of the gains exceed these costs for any reasonable
discount rate, even when the horizon is limited to forty years. For a theoretical discussion of the
conditions under which shifting from an unfinded to a finded program has a positive present
value, see Feldstein (1995c).
‘Because of the reduced rate of growth during the past two decades, the Social Security
Trustees (1995) assume that the rate of growth in the fiture will be only two percent.
7Rippe (1995), following the method described in Feldstein, Dicks-Mireaux and Poterba
(1983), found that the real pretax marginal rate of return on capital in the nonfinancial corporate
sector averaged 9.3 percent between 1960 and 1994.
Sstran.909 6retirement years. More specifically, consider an individual who is age 45 and who “saves” $2,600
(approximately the current average payroll tax payment) to finance retirement consumption at age
75, With the PAYGO real return of 2.5 percent, this $2,600 increases over the 30 year period to
$5454. If the individual had instead earned a real 9 percent return on his retirement saving, this
$5454 retirement amount could have been “purchased” at age 45 for only$411 instead of $2,600.
If the $2,600 PAYGO contribution is obtained by a 12,4 percent payroll tax, this implies that
the tax could be reduced to (411/2600) x 12.4 percent = 1.96 percent.
The individual benefits in two quite distinct ways from being in the high-yield finded program
rather than the low-yield PAYGO progrm. First, the individual saves $2190 in taxes at age 45 while
maintaining the original benefits in retirement. Second, the distortionary payroll tax is reduced from
12,4 percent to 1.96 percent. Each of these deserves more comment, as does the assumption that the
entire 9 percent pretax return is available to the mandatory individual retirement account.
First, the individual’s gain at age 45 is not a “fiture” gain in the form of higher benefits (that
might be discounted by the individual at a high personal discount rate) but a tax reduction available
immediately for additional consumption. Moreover, valuing this as $2190 of additional consumption
at age 45 may understate its value to the individual who may be able to obtain a higher level of utility
by saving some of that additional disposable income,
Second, the existing 12.4 percent payroll tax distorts employment and compensation
decisions. While 1.96 percentage points can be thought of as the amount needed to purchase a
ret irement benefit, the remaining 10,44 percentage points represent a pure tax. A deadweight loss
results from this tax because of the compensated change in individual labor supply broadly defined
(to include not only participation and hours but the choice of job, degree of effort, location, etc.) and
Sstrdn.909 7in the consumption of such things as fringe benefits and better working conditions that are not part
of taxable payroll income. The magnitude of the deadweight loss depends on the combined marginal
tax rate that results from the income and payroll taxes, Taking the combined federal and state
marginal income and sales tax rates to be 25 percent implies that the net payroll tax of 10,44 percent
raises the marginal tax rate from approximately 25 percent to approximately 35,5 percent, The
deadweight loss rises from being proportional to the square of 0,25 (i.e., to 0.0625) to being
proportional to the square of 0,355 (i.e., 0.126, about twice as large,)
Since the deadweight loss reflects changes in both labor supply and in the form of
compensation, the relevant elasticity is the compensated elasticity of the taxable income with respect
to the net-of-tax share of income (Feldstein, 1995a). If we write that elasticity as E, the increased
deadweight loss due to the 10.4 percent net payroll tax can be written (following Harberger (1964)
and Browning (1987)) as 0.5 & (O.126- 0.0625) (wL) / (1 - 0.355) where WL is the taxable payroll
and the division by 1-0,355 reflects the fact that the elasticity is evaluated empirically at the net-of-
tax wage rate (Browning, 1987), In the current example, since the 12.4 percent payroll tax produced
revenue of $2600, the value of wL is $20,967, The increased deadweight loss is therefore $1032 &.
Although estimates of& for changes in the income tax for high income individuals suggested values
of& between 1.0 and 1,5 (Feldstein, 1995b; Auten and Carroll, 1994), we will be conservative and
assume & = 0.5. With this value, the increased deadweight loss associated with a PAYGO tax of
12.4 percent is $516 or 2,5 percent of payroll earnings.
Note that this point is fundamentally different from the reduced payroll tax distortion
Sstran.909 8discussed inKotlikoff(1996) and in Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987). Their analysis emphasized the
fact that in the current Social Security system some individuals receive substantially higher implicit
rates of return on their contributions than others. They note that because of these differences and the
great complexity of the benefit rules, individuals may disregard the link between contributions and
benefits completely, treating the entire payroll tax as a pure tax for which nothing is received in
return. They then assume that shifiing to individualized accounts in which all individuals are treated
equally can be used to eliminate the deadweight loss that results from the payroll tax distortions m
if the individual accounts remain on a ~av-as-vou-~o basis They arrive at this conclusion by assuming
that the benefits could be paid in a way that eliminates the net tax at the margin even though the
average benefit represents a very low rate of return on the taxes paid. This is possible in their
simulation model because all individuals have the same income. In effect, Auerbach and Kotlikoff
require each individual to pay both a proportional payroll tax at a relatively low rate and a large lump
sum tax. The revenue from the lump sum tax is used to subsidize the benefits so that the implied
return on the payroll tax is equal to a market rate of return, eliminating the distorting effect of the
payroll tax. As a practical matter, however, a lump sum tax equal to at least two thirds of the average
Social Security payroll tax would not be feasible. Although some reductions in deadweight loss could
no doubt be achieved within the pay-as-you-go unfinded system by reducing the anomalies in the
links between taxes and benefits’, those gains would be small in comparison to the gains that would
be achieved by shifiing from a pay-as-you-go system to a finded system. All of the welfare gain from
reduced distortion in our current analysis comes about because individuals are investing in higher
*On the extent of these differences in effective tax rates, see Feldstein and Samwick
(1992).
Sstran.909 9yielding assets,
In summary, by being in a finded program rather than the PAYGO system, our 45 year old
individual saves 10.4 percent of payroll in contribution and an additional 2.5 percent of payroll in
reduced deadweight loss, For the individual, the gain is equivalent to 12.9 percent of payroll. Note
that this gain is more than the entire initial level of the payroll tax.
The relative size of the gain depends of course on the age of the individual. For someone at
age 30 the gain is substantially larger while for someone on the verge of retirement it is significantly
smaller. A 30 year old who now pays a tax of $2600 to buy benefits at age 75 could buy those
benefits in a finded program (with a 9 percent return ) with a payment of only $55. A 65 year old
who is buying benefits at age 75 can only reduce his cost from $2600 to $1406.
To get a very rough sense of the overall aggregate effect, consider a workforce of individuals
between ages 30 and 65 with each year’s cohort 1 percent larger than the cohort born a year earlier,
If all individuals earn the same average income and save to receive benefits at age 75, a PAYGO
system with a 12.4 percent tax would provide the same benefit as a finded system with a 9 percent
rate of return and a contribution rate of 2.2 percent, This is surprisingly close to the example of the
45 year old examined above. The combination of the reduced contribution and the reduced
deadweight loss due to the distorting payroll taxis equivalent to about 12.5 percent of payroll up to
the Social Security maximum. Since the payroll covered by Social Security is about 40 percent of
GDP (Trustee’s Re~ofi, page 190) the gain from having a finded system rather than a PAYGO
system is equal to about 5 percent of GDP.
This calculation assumes that it is appropriate to attribute the entire real pretax return of 9
percent to the Mandatory Individual Retirement Accounts. About 40 percent of the 9 percent pretax
Sstran.909 10return on capital (i,e., an amount equal to a 3,6 percent return on the private capital investment) is
now collected by the government in corporate taxes and property taxes. It would be reasonable and
fti for this return to be given back to the capital that earned it by crediting the Mandatory Individual
Retirement Accounts with a goverment matching contribution that supplements the income earned
in the account oust as the Treasury now rebates the tax collected on Social Security benefits to the
Social Security trust find.) This “government contribution” would not represent a net cost to the
government since it would simply be the extra corporate tax collected because of the new finded
retirement accounts.9
3. The Strategy of Privatization
The strategy of privatization that we pursue in this study does not deal with the normative
issue of the proper level of Social Security benefits. Instead, we assume that benefits in each fiture
year will be maintained at the same levels that would prevail in the absence of privatization. We also
assume that, by investing the MIRA accounts in the market mixture of debt and equity and receiving
rebates of the tax revenues collected from the corporations on the incremental MIRA capital, the
MIRA finds can earn the real pretax return of 9 percent. If these finds are used to purchase annuities
(so that there are no bequests to children from m accounts), the fill 9 percent can be used to
9It would clearly be wrong to ignore the approximately 3.6 percent return captured in
taxes and credit the mandatory retirement accounts with just the net 5.4 percent, It could however
be assumed as a matter of political economy that the government would not credit this 3.6
percent of MIRA assets back to the M~s but would spend it on current consumption or tax
cuts. If so, it would be necessary to recalculate the mandatory retirement contributions on the
basis of the lower return and to consider a way to treat the corporate tax collections as an offset
to the resulting higher payroll taxes. We present such a calculation based on a 5.4 percent return
on MIRA assets in section 5.5 below.
Sslran.909 11find retirement and survivor benefits. 10
As noted above, the fiture benefits in our baseline case are not the level of benefits implied
by the formula in current law since that is not feasible without substantially raising the existing 12.4
percent payroll tax rate. The Social Security actuaries now project that under current law the real
value of the trust find begins declining in 2015 and reaches zero in 2030. Our simulations essentially
reproduce this projection. To assume a feasible baseline benefit path, we assume that benefits in each
year after 2030 are adjusted to the level that can be financed in that year with a 12.4 percent payroll
tax, Thus, the trust find is zero in each year afier 2030.11
After the privatization begins, individuals (or their employers or both) are required to
contribute to a Mandato~ Individual Retirement Account (m). The amount that is contributed
for each individual depends on that individual’s age and is calculated to be such that, when the
privatization process is fifly phased in12,the contribution would grow at 9 percent to equal the same
benefit stream in retirement that the individual would have obtained under the existing unfinded
system (as modified to maintain solvency) by contributing 12.4 percent of his/her covered earnings. 13
10Weare not explicit in the current analysis about survivors or the treatment of spouses.
Similarly, the 12.4 percent tax rate includes Social Security disability benefits and these are
implicitly incorporated into our system.
11 Section 9 presents an alternative analysis in which taxes are raised afier 2029 to maintain
the level of benefits implied by current law.
“We discuss a phase-in method of gradually shifiing from the current system to the MIRA
system in section 5,
131fall individuals make MIRA contributions in this way, the transition is similar in spirit to
the system of recognition bonds used for Social Security privatization by Chile and other
countries. It differs in defining the value of the individual’s claim to be based on the benefits to
which he is entitled rather than the taxes that he paid. The current strategy also has the feature
that the existing payroll tax is used to pay principal and interest on the implicit “recognition
Ss(ran.909 12Each individual’s MIRA contribution is credited against that individual’s payroll tax obligation. A
temporary uniform payroll t= surcharge must therefore be levied on all employees and employers to
maintain the Social Security trust find on its currently projected path. 14
In the first year of privatization individuals and their employers in the aggregate thus pay an
amount equal to the fill 12.4 percent Social Security payroll tax plus a surcharge that in the aggregate
has the value of the specified MIRA contributions.
It is tempting to say that that the MIRA surcharge is umecessary since the credit given for
the MIRA contributions could instead be offset by reducing the existing Social Security trust find.
But reducing the trust find in this way would defeat the purpose of them contributions. The
reduction in the trust find would exactly offset the increase in capital formation in the MIRAs that
provides the higher return than the current unfinded system.
To assure that the nation’s aggregate capital stock increases by the amount of the MIRA
contributions, we assume that the payroll tax plus the surcharge is set in each year to maintain the
trust fund at the level that would have prevailed in the absence of privatization. (This is not
necessary, but any decision to reduce the trust find must be reflected in a lower capital stock and a
reduction in national income calculated as the product of the reduced capital stock and the marginal
bonds” and that those “bonds” are completely paid off at the death of the youngest covered
worker at the time of privatization,
I’There are of course many alternative transition paths with different distributional
consequences for employees of different ages. For example, if MIRA contributions are not
credited against payroll tax obligations, the transition is much more favorable to younger
employees and less favorable to those nearer to retirement. In principle, payroll tax rates could
vary by age.
Sstran.909 13product of capital, not the government bond rate,)
The pure pay-as-y ou-go payroll tax that is required to keep the current trust find path
unchanged declines gradually as more and more of the retirement benefits come to be finded out of
the MIRAs Eventually, the traditional payroll tax is unnecessary and the only contribution that
individuals are required to make is to the Mandato~ Individual Retirement Account. 15
Under the current law, Social Security benefits are based only on the taxes that individuals
pay when they are 30 years old or older (technically, on the 35 years of highest income). If fill
privatization began now for all employees between the ages of 30 and 65 (we assume that everyone
retires at age 6516),when the current 30 year olds retire they would not receive any PAYGO benefits
but would receive benefits wholly on the basis of their MIRA contributions. Those who are now over
the age of 30 would continue to have some vestige of PAYGO benefits as long as they live, The
payrofl tax could therefore continue for as long as 70 years but at a very much reduced rate, At some
point in the fiture, long before 70 years from now, the reduction in the PAYGO benefits to retirees
would exceed the m contributions. At that point and ever afier that, the combination of the
payroll tax and the MIRA contribution would be less than the 12.4 percent payroll tax.
The specific timing of this cross-over from mandatory contributions (the payroll tax plus the
MIRA contributions) that are greater than 12.4 percent to mandatory contributions that are lower
than 12.4 percent will depend on such things as (1) whether participation is initially universal or is
15Atsome point, when the traditional payroll taxis small enough, the system of crediting
MIRA contributions would be eliminated. By then, all individuals would be paying a combined
MIRA contribution plus payroll tax that is substantially less than the current 12.4 percent.
‘GTo the extent that those who retire before (afier) age 65 have an actuarially fair
reduction (increase) in their benefits, the age of retirement does not matter for our calculations.
ssiran.909 14phased in over time and (2) whether the MLRA contributions are immediately set to substitute
completely for the 12.4 percent finding of fiture benefits or for just a fraction of those benefits. We
focus on the case in which everyone over age 29 is covered immediately but in which the MIRA
contributions begin at a level equal to just one-fourth of the full amount required to find fiture
benefits and rise gradually until they reach the fill amount afier 25 years,
Before turning to our detailed analysis of the transition options for the U.S. economy, it may
be helpfil to consider briefly the way that our basic transition would operate in a simple stylized
economy, For this purpose, we assume that the economy experiences steady state growth at 2.5
percent and currently has an unfinded Social Security program in which benefits rise at 2,5 percent
a year at a level that is compatible with a constant 12.4 percent payroll tax rate. We assume also that
additions to the capital stock earn a real return of 9 percent, (The key differences from the actual
situation in the United States is that the U.S combination of benefit promises, changing demography,
and initial trust find are not consistent with a 2.5 percent implicit return and are not financially
viable.)
The required MIRA contributions in this steady state economy have already been derived in
section 2 above. We saw there that a 45 year old who earned 9 percent instead of 2.5 percent could
replace a 124 percent tax with a 1.96 percent MIRA contribution. More generally, we saw that if the
labor force is growing at one percent a year, the real wage rate is rising at 1.5 percent a year, and all
workers earn the same wage, the 12.4 percent tax could be replaced by a 2.2 percent MM
contribution.
The 2.2 percent is therefore an estimate of the level of MIRA contributions that would be
possible in steady state after the last PAYGO retiree had died. It is also a rough estimate of the
S5tran.909 15payment that workers (and/or their employers) would have to make in the first year of the transition
(before there is any benefit replacement) in addition to the 12.4 percent PAYGO tax if there is an
immediate shift to fi.dlMIRA contributions. 17Thus the tax rises in the first year to 14,6 percent, In
the second year, however, the new retirees receive some of their retirement income from them
saving that they did in the previous year and therefore receive less in PAYGO benefits. Thus 14.6
percent would be the maximum tax during the privatization period and would fall rapidly over the
transition period as the amount of the fiture PAYGO retiree benefits is replaced by MIRA benefits.
Rather than explore the time path for this hypothetical economy, we return to the simulation
analysis of the actual US economy and its current and fiture demographic structure.
4. The SS-SIM Model
This section describes the micro simulation model that we use to analyze alternative
privatization paths. The model has four basic components: (1) demographic projections; (2) basic
economic assumptions; (3) Social Security rules; and (4) the response of taxpayers to changes in tax
rates and the associated changes in deadweight losses. The model is calibrated so that with the current
Social Security rules it reproduces the basic time series of benefits, revenues, and trust fund assets
predicted in the 1995 Social Securitv Trustees Re~ort.
4.1 Demo~rauhics
The unit of analysis in the simulation is the individual. We simplifi the Social Security rules
17Witha 25 percent phase-in in the first year, the corresponding incremental payment
would be one-fourth of the 2.2 percent or 0.55 percent.
sstrAn.909 16by making no specific adjustments for married couples or survivor benefits. The values of these
benefits as well as of the disability benefits are all subsumed in the projected individual retirement
benefits.
Our analysis incorporates the actual current age structure of the population and the Census
Bureau projections of fi.lture births through 2050 and the cohort specific life tables for individuals
born through 2050. ‘g To reflect the net inflow of immigrants, we scale up the projected population
at eve~ age to coincide with the aggregate projections of the Social Security Administration.
4,2 Economic Assumptions
The simulations assume that individuals enter the labor force at age 21 and work until age 65
(or death if that occurs sooner). Since not everyone in the population actually works during these
years and since there are workers in revered employment at younger and older ages, we select a labor
force participation rate among 21 to 64 year olds that gives the correct number of covered workers
in 1995 (Trustees Rer)ort page 122.). This is a 94 percent participation rate among individuals aged
21 through 64, The number of workers in fi.lture years is also calibrated to the Social Security
projections, implying small fluctuations in fiture labor force participation rates.
The assumed wage in 1995 is the average earnings in covered employment ($24,825). This
reflects the ceiling on taxable wages ($ 61,200 in 1995) but overstates the taxable payroll because
some employees with multiple jobs exceed the maximum taxable wage. Taxable payroll per employee
I“Our source for the initial population numbers is US Po~ulation Estimates bv Age. Sex .
Race and His~anic Origin 1990-1995 (Bureau of the Census, 1996a). The Census source of both
births and mortality projections is P ~ulation Projections of the United States (Bureau of the
Census, 1996b).
Sstran.909 17has averaged about 83.5 percent of the average wage in covered employment, a ratio that we assume
holds in the fiture as well.
We use the historic data for average earnings in covered employment in previous years and
follow the intermediate assumption in the 1995 Trustees’ Report that, tier 1995, the average real
wage rises at 1,0 percent per year, The movements in the average real wage are assumed to reflect
changes in the age structure of the labor force and differences among age groups in the rate of
increase of wages. More specifically, based on the pattern of covered earnings by age as reported in
the 1995 Social Securitv Statistical Su~~lement, we assume that annual earnings rise at g + 3 percent
for individuals under age 35, at g + 1 percent for individuals between35 and 45, and at g minus 1.5
percent for those above 45 years old where the value of g for each year is chosen to make the overall
rise in wages equal to the historic record before 1995 and to the projected 1 percent rise after 1995.
The Social Security Trustees assume that the assets in the trust find will earn a 2.3 percent
real interest rate in the fiture. Since the basic policies that we study leave the path of benefits and
taxes (and therefore of the trust find) unchanged, this rate of interest is not relevant for the analysis
of these options.
The real marginal product of capital is assumed to be 9 percent. As noted above, the average
pretax rate of return on capital in the non6nancid corporate sector from 1960 through 1994 has been
slightly above 9 percent (Rippe, 1995). This figure is derived, following Feldstein, Dicks-Mireaux and
Poterba (1983) by adding corporate profits, net interest payments, and all taxes paid to measure the
pretax product of capital and then dividing that by the estimate of the capital stock at replacement
Sstran.909 18cost. 19Our estimate makes no allowance for the lower return that is earned on capital outside the
corporate sector or on the net effect of increased capital accumulation on the marginal product of
capital and on the net international capital flow.
4,3 Social Securitv Rules
Each individual is subject to an initial Social Security payroll tax of 12.4 percent. Since
average real wages are projected to rise at 1,0 percent a year, we increase taxable wages at that same
rate,
Because we use the individual as the unit of analysis, we do not have separate sumivors’
benefits. The “return” on contributions to Social Security (and to the MIRAs) is calculated as if it
is all paid in the form of annuities to the retired individuals, We also do not make separate provision
for disability benefits. We include the disability tax by using the 12.4 percent tax rate but include the
disability benefits with the retirement annuity.
Individuals become eligible for benefits at age 65 in the simulation and receive benefits until
they die, In actual practice, some individuals retire earlier than 65 and some wait until later to retire.
To the extent that Social Security benefits are adjusted for the retirement age in an actuarially fair
way, these differences in retirement age do not change the costs of providing benefits.
Because we do not distinguish income levels or family structures, we cannot apply the actual
Social Security benefit rules. We therefore calculate benefits by attributing a rate of return on the
taxes that each individual has paid, We follow current Social Security rules and assume that ordy
those taxes paid between age 30 and 65-- the highest 35 years of earnings -- are used in calculating
19Thesefigures relate profits and interest earned in the United States to the value of the
domestic capital stock.
sstran.9(19 19benefits. Thecohoti specific real rates ofreturn thatweuse aremodifications ofearlier estimates by
Boskinet al(1987); their estimates, which were forsingle earner couples, have been adjusted to
produce aggregate benefit amounts that coincide with the Trustees’ projections of the benefits
implied by the current law for fiture years:
Year of birth Pre-1915 1915 1930 1945 1960 1975 1990+
Real Rate of 7.0 Yo 4,21% 2.52% 1,67% 1.3970 1.390/0 1.430/0
Return
Even with the lower rates of return for younger workers implied by this procedure, the
projected benefits cannot be financed by the existing 12.4 percent OASDI tax rate because of the
changing age structure of the population. The changing demographics cause the trust find to be
exhausted in the year 2030. Our basic simulations assume that at that point benefits under the
existing system would be reduced to the level that can be financed on a current basis by the taxes
collected with a 12.4 percent payroll tax. The calculations presented in the next section show that this
requires a benefit reduction that begins at 18 percent and rises to 35 percent, Two alternatives are
also examined: the analysis in section 8 modifies the existing inflation indexing rule while the analysis
of section 9 maintains the current law benefits by increasing the tax or MIRA contributions,.
4.4 Tax~avers rest)onses. tax rates and deadwei~ht losses.
The projections of taxable earnings described in section 4,2 have to be modified to incorporate
the changes in taxpayer behavior that would result from changes in the payroll tax rates. This is
important both to estimate the required payroll tax rates and the associated changes in deadweight
losses, Traditional estimates of the effects of tax rates on labor supply indicate that participation rates
Sstran.909 20and average hours are quite insensitive to net-of-tax wages among prime age males and single women
but much more sensitive among married women, However, this is too narrow a measure of
taxpayers’ responses for the current purpose, The change in revenue and therefore the required
revenue-neutral change in tax rates reflects not only changes in working hours but in a broader
definition of labor supply (that includes the choice of job, the degree of effort, location, etc.) as well
any shifi between cash compensation and fringe benefits, improved working conditions, and other
things that are not subject to the payroll tax. Feldstein (1995a) showed that the deadweight loss
associated with the tax rate depends on the compensated elasticity of taxable income with respect to
the net of tax share.
There is, unfortunately, no good evidence on this elasticity for changes in the payroll tax rate.
The estimated elasticities of between 1,0 and 1,5 for the income tax (Feldstein 1995b and Auten and
Carroll, 1994) are not directly relevant because they include changes in deductibles and are for higher
income individuals. We assume in what follows that the uncompensated elasticity of labor earnings
with respect to the relevant net of tax rate is only 0.5. Although the compensated elasticity would be
larger, we also use an elasticity of 0,5 for the deadweight 10SScalculations. The calculation of the
earnings response and the associated adjustment in the tax rate, as well as the implications for the
deadweight losses, are developed in section 5.3.
Our analysis does not take into account the broader general equilibrium effects of the shifi to
a finded system. The primary general equilibrium effect is the impact of the increased national capital
stock on the rate of return and on real wages, Although the higher real wages reinforce the effect of
lower tax rates to increase labor supply, the effect is smaller than the tax effect because the higher
marginal product of labor does not affect the choice between taxable wages and other forms of
Sstran.909 21compensation,20
5. Simulation Results for Gradual Privatization
This section begins by presenting the values of key variables under current law and then shows
the “solvency adjustment” to benefits needed to avoid a tax increase when the trust find is exhausted.
The section then goes on to consider the effect of a gradual privatization on tax rates and on the
deadweight loss of the tax system.
5.1 Current Law and Baseline Simulations
Table 1 shows the projected values of the numbers of covered workers and of beneficiaries
in each year from 1995 through 2071, (The number of beneficiaries is the number of persons who
are supported by Social Security In a married couple, this is two persons regardless of whether each
would claim benefits as a retired worker or one would claim as a dependent spouse.)
The ratio of covered workers per beneficiary declines from the current value of 3,27 to 2.03
in the year 2031 and then continues to decline to 1.80 at the end of the period.
Table 2 shows our simulation of the projected values of payroll tax receipts and of retirement
benefits under current law. The payroll tax revenue is the result of a constant 12,4 percent rate
applied to the projected labor force with real wages per employee growing at 1,0 percent per year.
The initial payroll tax per worker is $2,570. All dollar amounts are reported in constant 1995 dollars,
The retirement benefits reflect the projected numbers of retirees and the assumption that
2’JForexamples of the general equilibrium analysis of the effects of social security reforms,
see Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) and Kotlikoff (1996 and in this volume).
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Table 1 DEMOGRAPHIC PROJECTIONS
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Table 2 CURRENT LAW: TAXES AND BENEFITS
--- ---- -—_ ---— ——--------- ---- ——______ ——-— —___ ____ ____
A) Payroll Taxes ($ billions)
1995 362.96 369.91 376.96 384.12
2002 413.23 420.63 428.13 435.75
2009 465.30 472.95 479.40 485.94
2016 511.90 517.81 523.79 529.84
2023 554.23 560.47 566.76 573.41
2030 600.76 608.21 615.74 623.37
2037 654.70 662.75 670.89 679.13
2044 711.17 719.41 727.40 735.48
2051 768.47 776.79 785.19 793.69
2058 828.63 837.61 846.68 855.92
2065 893.90 903.58 913.37 923.26
B) Payroll Taxes per Worker ($ thousands)
1995 2.57 2.60 2.62
2002 2.76 2.78 2.81
2009 2.95 2.98 3.01
2016 3.17 3.20 3.23
2023 3.40 3.43 3.46
2030 3.64 3.68 3.71
2037 3.90 3.94 3.98
2044 4.19 4.23 4.27
2051 4.49 4.53 4.58
2058 4.81 4.86 4.91
2065 5.16 5.21 5.26
C) Retirement Benefits ($ billions)
1995 324.72 331.44 338.02
2002 374.17 382.29 390.56
2009 441.79 452.67 466.87
2016 546.18 564.51 582.85
2023 673.18 690.91 708.69
2030 783.16 794.17 804.99
2037 854.47 862.13 870.04
2044 917.61 929.38 942.67
2051 1021.89 1040.90 1061.14
2058 1174.02 1197.94 1222.39
2065 1334.81 1355.78 1376.50
D) Benefits per Retiree ($ thousands)
1995 7.51 7.56 7.60
2002 7.83 7.89 7.95
2009 8.26 8.33 8.39
2016 8.79 8.87 8.95
2023 9.29 9.34 9.40
2030 9.69 9.74 9.80
2037 10.11 10.17 10.23
2044 10.65 10.76 10.87
2051 11.56 11.71 11.87
2058 12.79 12.99 13.18





































































































































































15.06benefits are calculated by giving a return to each cohort as described above,
Table 3 shows how the trust fund evolves under current law. The find is increased by the
payroll taxes received, receipts from the Treasury, and interest on the find balance, and is reduced
by the benefits paid and administrative expenses,21 In addition, the trust fund is assumed to spend 0.8
percent of benefits on administrative costs.22
The simulations show that the net additions to the trust find continue to be positive until
2012 and then turn negative. Even tier net additions to the trust find (from taxes and Treasury
transfers minus benefits and administrative costs) become negative, the trust fund continues to grow
because of the interest earned on the government bonds in which the finds are invested and the
Treasury tax collections on benefits that are transferred to the trust find. At its peak in the year
2015, the trust find has $1482 billion (at the 1995 price level). The decline in the trust find after that
date causes the find to be exhausted in the year 2030, a date that also coincides with the Social
Security actuaries’ projection.
Since a negative trust find is not feasible, we assume for the rest of our calculations in this
section that the current system shifts to a pay-as-you-go basis afier 2030 with benefits reduced to
keep outlays equal to the finds raised by a combination of the 12.4 percent payroll tax and the
Treasury tax collections on existing benefits, all net of the small administrative charge. Table 4 shows
21Under current law, the Treasury adds to the Social Security trust find the income tax
that it collects on benefits. This starts with a ve~ small amount ($5.13 billion in 1995) but grows
rapidly because the income tax is applied to 85 percent of benefits above an unindexed amount of
$32,000 per couple and $25,000 per single individual. The calculations of the cohort specific rates
of return are based on benefits net of the income tax so that this is already taken into account,
22The administrative cost of the finded program is assumed to come from the difference
between the assumed 9 percent rate of return and the total return of 9.30 percent that Rippe
(1995) actually reported.
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Table 3 CURRENT LAW: TRUST FUND
--—- _—— ————— ———_ ____ __— —__ --—— ———— --—— ——---— ——
A) Net Addition to Trust Fund ($ billions)
1995 35.65 35.82 36.24 36.59 36.92 37.05 36.53
2002 36.06 35.2I3 34.45 33.63 30.33 26.95 23.34
2009 19.97 16.65 8.79 0.08 -8.67 -17.44 -26.43
2016 -38.65 -51.22 -63.72 -76.14 -138.57 -100.71 -112.50
2023 -124.33 -135.97 -147.60 -155.68 -163.79 -172.01 -180.29
2030 -188.66 -192.32 -195.69 -199.26 -202.97 -206.92 -206.88
2037 -206.60 -206.27 -206.11 -206.26 -207.29 -208.79 -210.98
2044 -213.77 -217.41 -222.81 -228.92 -235.60 -242.70 -250.77
2051 -261.60 -272.44 -284.43 -297.26 -311.10 -325.44
2058
-340.00
-354.78 -369.92 -385.49 -399.50 -413.10 -426.30 -439.13
2065 -451.60 -463.05 -474.15 -484.I36 -495.29 -505.43 -515.32
B) Total Amount in Trust Fund ($ billions)
1995 501.70 559.60 619.90 681.29 743.41 805.73
2002
867.24
928.45 988.80 1047.97 1105.71 1161.47 1215.13 1266.42
2009 1315.52 1362.43 1402.56 1434.90 1459.23 1475.34 1482.84
2016 1478.30 1461.08 1430.97 1387.74 1331.09 1261.00 1177.50
2023 1080.26 969.14 843.83 707.56 560.05 400.91
2030
229.84
46.46 -144.79 -343.81 -550.98 -766.62 -991.17 -1220.85
2037 -1455.54 -1695.29 -1940.39 -2191.27 -2448.96 -2714.08 -2987.48
2044 -3269.97 -3562.58 -3867.33 -4185.20 -4517.06 -4863.65 -5226.28
2051 -5608.09 -6009.51 -6432.17 -6877.36 -7346.64 -7841.05 -8361.40
2058 -8908.49 -9483.30 -10086.91 -10718.41 -11378.03 -12066.03 -12782.68
2065 -13528.28 -14302.48 -15105.58 -15937.88 -16799.74 -17691.56 -18613.79
--—— ___ _——— ———— _---- -—-— — --- ---- ——- ---- ---— --—- —-- --
Table 4 CURRENT LAW: SOLVENCY ADJUSTMENT
--- -- -—- ---- -- --- ---
A) Fraction by Which Benefits Must Be Reduced (Percent)
1995 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2002 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2009 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2016 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2023 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2030 0.00 18.09 24.12 24.22
2037 23.99 23.74 23.50 23.30
2044 23.11 23.21 23.45 23.74
2051 25.40 25.97 26.59 27.25
2058 29.98 30.63 31.29 31.82
2065 33.56 33.88 34.17 34.43
B) New Path of Retirement Benefits ($ billions)
1995 324.72 331.44 338.02 344.77
2002 374.17 382.29 390.56 398.92
2009 441.79 452.67 466.87 482.00
2016 546.18 564.51 582.85 601.17
2023 673.18 690.91 708.69 723.30
2030 783.16 650.54 610.86 618.42
2037 649.51 657.49 665.57 673.74
2044 705.53 713.70 721.63 729.64
2051 762.37 770.62 778.96 787.39
2058 822.06 830.96 839.96 849.13
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Table 5 PHASE-IN FROM PARTIW TO TOTAL PRIVATIZATION
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20.25 23.12 26.18 29.44 32.88 36.43
44.07 48.04 52.22 56.67 61.11 65.70
75.07 79.99 84.82 88.94 93.25 97.70
106.10 110.13 114.06 117.82 121.27 120.74
120.09 119.59 118.81 118.04 117.53 117.14
116.82 117.11 118.10 118.88 119.58 120.03
121.17 122.29 123.42 124.33 125.21 126.20
127.96 128.60 129.28 129.89 130.58 131.44
132.69 133.78 134.61 135.35 135.87 136.38
137.91 138.89 139.94 141.10 142.35 143.70
146.67 148.27 149.94 151.68 153.49 155.35



































































C) Benefits Replaced Due to Privatization ($ billions)
1995 0.00 0.13 0.38 0.78 1.35
2002 4.52 6.22 8.25 10.62 13.57
2009 25.93 31.17 37.29 45.26 53.82
2016 85.18 97.86 111.70 126.74 143.23
2023 198.55 218.93 240.74 262.44 284.59
2030 355.89 310.24 303.98 320.95 338.42
2037 393.42 411.53 430.08 449.32 468.52
2044 527.69 548.06 568.03 587.98 607.72
2051 664.97 682.81 700.46 717.66 734.44
2058 780.86 795.15 808.95 822.37 835.40






























































































































































































































2.11the percentage by which benefits must be reduced beginning in 2031. The reduction goes from about
18 percent in that year to 24 in the next and then rises steadily, These simulation results provide the
basis for the alternative privatization paths that we now consider,
5.2 Phase-in from Partial to Total Privatization
Table 5 shows the effect of starting with a partial privatization for everyone and then
expanding the privatized share until it completely substitutes for the ufinded program. More
specifically, in the first year individuals are required to contribute to the MIRA an amount which at
a 9 percent rate of return will accumulate enough by age 65 to replace one-fourth of the
corresponding utinded Social Security benefits, In the second year, the share of retirement benefits
that is to be prefinded (by that year’s contributions) rises from 25 percent to 28 percent. The
privatized share increases in this way by three percentage points a year for 25 years until MIRA
contributions are enough to pre-find 100 percent of the benefits associated with that year’s
contributions, (These figures ignore the effect of changes in tax rates on pretax earnings, a restriction
that we correct in section 5.3.)
The contribution to the Mandatory Individual Retirement Account is $20.3 billion in 1995.
This implies that the MIRA contributions are equivalent to 0.69 percent of taxable payroll, an amount
shown in the second group of numbers, designated Table 5B within Table 5. This measures the extent
to which the existing generation of employees is required in the first year of the transition to “pay for
their own retirement as well as for the existing retiree benefits.” It is clearly very much less than
having to pay twice the existing payroll tax (i.e., an additional 12.4 percent) that some critics of
privatization imply.
Sstran.909 24Since there are no MIRA benefits paid in 1995, part 5C of table 5 shows no “Benefits
Replaced Due to Privatization” for 1995. The basic payroll tax needed to meet the existing benefit
requirements and to keep the trust find on its original trajectory therefore remains 12,40 percent of
payroll, the amount shown for 1995 in part 5D of the table.
Combining the 0.69 percent of payroll MIRA contribution with the 12.4 percent Payroll Tax
Needed to Maintain the Trust Fund Trajectory implies total contributions of 13.09 percent of payroll,
the amount shown in part 5E of the table.23
As the privatization program moves forward through time, two major changes occur. First,
the amount of MIRA contributions rises as (1) the privatization share rises from 25 percent to 100
percent over a 25 year phase-in period and (2) as the labor force grows and wages increase. This
increase in MIRA contributions is shown in Table 5A, The changing age structure of the workforce
and the changes in relative benefit levels projected for the fiture also cause the mandatory individual
contributions as a percentage of payroll to va~ in a moderate way; Table 5B shows that the
contribution per dollar of payroll reaches a high of2.81 percent of payroll in 2011 and then declines
to a Iong-mn level of 2.04 percent of payroll.
The second mejor change is the gradual replacement of the unfinded Social Security benefits
with the MIRA benefits. In 1996, those who were 64 years old in 1995 retire and receive some
231twould of course be possible to keep the combined MIRA contributions and payroll tax
unchanged while meeting existing benefit obligations by reducing the trust find or by explicit
borrowing from the public by the social security program. Either of these would increase the
unified budget deficit and reduce national saving by an amount that offsets the increased national
saving in the MIRAs. Of course, if additional actions were taken to keep the budget deficit
unchanged, the national saving rate would still increase by the amount of the MIRA
accumulations. The possibility of these additional changes in government spending or taxes lies
beyond the scope of the current paper.
Ssiran.909 25benefits based on their MIRA contributions in the previous year. These benefits are just $0.13 billion
(as shown in Table SC). By the year 2000, these benefits are $1.35 billion; this reduces the pay-as-
you-go tax rate required to maintain the trust find trajectory from 12.40 percent to 12,36 percent.
Over time, this benefit replacement becomes much more important, Mer 20 years (in 20 14),
MIRA benefits reach $63.07 billion and therefore permit the payroll tax needed to maintain the trust
find trajectory to decline from the initial 12,40 percent to 10.82 percent, as shown in table SD. Seven
years later, in 2021, the required pay-as-you-go taxis down to 8.69 percent,
Those individuals who are 30 years old or younger in 2020 (when them system is filly
phased in) eventually fiance their retirement solely with MIRA withdrawals, Unlike earlier cohorts,
they receive no PAYGO benefits. Since we assume that no one lives beyond age 100, this means that
the PAYGO system is completely finished by the seventieth year afier privatization begins (i.e., in
2090). The results in table 5D show that, as a practical matter, the required pay-as-you-go payroll
tax is essentially zero (i.e., less than 0.5 percent) in 2059 and beyond,
Combining the MIRA contribution (part 5B) and the required payroll tax (table 5D) produces
the combined payroll tax and MIRA contribution shown in Table 5E. This combination remains
higher than the existing 12.4 percent payroll tax for 24 years, After that, the combined cost falls
rapidly. In the thirtieth year, the combined ratio is down to 10.16 percent and by the fortieth year it
is down to only 8.02 percent, less than two-thirds of the original 12,4 percent payroll tax that would
otherwise be required to finance the same benefits, These figures imply that an individual who is a
young employee at the start of privatization pays slightly higher taxes plus contributions in the early
years but then sharply lower total taxes and contributions during later years. Before looking at the
implication of such individual time paths for the present value of such payments, we consider the
Sstran.909 26effect of the plan on taxpayers’ behavior and the implications of that response for tax rates and
deadweight losses,
5.3 Behavioral Resuonse. Required Tax Rates and Deadweight Losses
The existing payroll tax causes employees to reduce their labor supply (broadly defined to
include effort, occupational choice, and location as well as the number of hours worked) and to
substitute untaxed fringe benefits and nicer working conditions for taxable cash compensation. We
model the reduction in taxable payroll earnings as the product of an elasticity and the change in the
marginal net-of-tax share of wages, i,e,, as the product of an elasticity and “one minus the effective
marginal tax rate”. The effective marginal tax rate includes the federal and state personal income tax
rate, the effective state and local sales tax rates, and the @ payroll tax rate, We assume (quite
conservatively) a rate of 20 percent for the taxes other than the payroll tax. The @ payroll tax rate
is the difference between the payroll tax payment (12.4 percent of payroll) and the amount that the
individual would have to pay to purchase the same benefit at the higher rate of return available in the
market
The cost of purchasing that benefit is calculated in the following way. If the implicit rate of
return that the individual earns on Social Security payroll taxes 24is denoted y, a dollar of payroll tax
paid at age ~ could provide a cash benefit of (1 + y)”- a at age 65. If ann65(y)is the actuarial present
value of a dollar a year from age 65 to death based on a return of y, the dollar of payroll tax paid at
age ~ earns an amuity starting at age 65 of (1 + y)b5 a/ann65(y). To purchase that same annuity in
24Recall that this implicit return has declined from 7.0 percent among individuals born
before 1915 to less than 1.5 percent among individuals born afier 1960.
SstrAn.909 27a private pension plan, an employer would have to spend only [(1 + ~)G5 -‘ /ann65(w)]- 1 where ~ is
the rate ofretum earned in the private pension alternative. Because pension finds do not pay tax on
their income, a plausible value for ~ is the return on capital net of corporate and property taxes but
before all personal income t=es. A pretax real return of 9 percent and a corporate tax rate (including
state taxes and property trees) of 40 percent imply v = 5.4 percent, Since v is substantially greater
than y, there is a substantial effective tax implied by the payroll tw, For example, since someone born
in 1960 would receive a return on Social Security taxes of ofly y = 1.39 percent, each dollar of
payroll tax could be replaced by ordy 9.7 cents of contribution to a private pension find. This implies
that 90,3 percent of the 12.4 percent payroll taxis a pure tax since the same benefits could be bought
for a private pension contribution of only 1.2 percent of the individual’s payroll, More generally, we
define the effective payroll tax rate as{ 1- [(1+ y)/(1+ ~)]’5- a[ann65(p)/ann65 (y)]} ~, where ~,
is the payroll tax rate (currently O,124). Alternatively, we can write the individual’s effective payroll
tax rate as ~P - ~ where ~ = [(l+ y)/(1+ ~)]”-a [ann65(w)/ann65 (y)] z, is the value of the benefit
that the individual receives per dollar of incremental earnings.25
Combining this with the marginal personal income tax rate (e) implies a net of tax share under
existing Social Security rules of 1 – e – 7P+ ~. We shall denote this net of tax share by NO For
example, with 8 = 0.20, y = 0.0139 and ~ = 0.054, the net of tax share for a current 35 year old is
NO= 0.688,
In the MIRA system, the individual would continue to pay a payroll tax to meet the remaining
pay-as-you-go benefit obligations plus a surcharge to offset the revenue lost because individuals
“Our analysis does not classifi individuals by income level and therefore does not
distinguish between the average and marginal benefits per dollar of earnings.
Ssiran 909 28reduce their regular payroll tax obligations by the amount of their MIRA contributions, If we denote
this combined tax plus surcharge, shown in Table 5E as “Total Payroll Tax plus Mandatory
Contributio~” by T*Pwe can write the individual’s net-of-tax share under them system as NL
= 1 – O – T*P + ~ (where ~ is the same as in the current system since the value of the benefits are
unchanged by switching to the MIRA system. )
At first, the net of tax share declines because T*Pis greater than the ~P under the existing
system. After a while, however, the net of tax rate rises and the corresponding effective marginal tax
rate falls.
Our assumed elasticity of 0.5 implies that taxable income rises by a factor of [ NI / NO]05.
This in turn means that the payroll tax revenue collected by tax rate 7P with the initial labor supply
can be collected at a lower tax rate Z’P = ZP [N, / No] -05. Similarly the personal income tax
rate that collects the same revenue falls to 0’ = e [ N~/ No ] -05.
The path of the adjusted tax rates is shown in panels 6B and 6C of Table 6. In the first year,
the combination of the MIRA surcharge and the unchanged payroll tax causes the net-of-tax-share
to fall and therefore the aggregate labor supply to decline, The effect is small and is offset by raising
the payroll tax rate from 12.40 percent to 12.46 percent. Similarly, the personal income tax rate only
has to be raised from 20 percent to 20.10 percent. But by the eighth year the payroll tax rate is lower
than the initial 12.4 percent and by year 25 the increased taxable labor income causes the payroll tax
rate to be lower than it would be with no allowance for the change in labor income (i.e., by year 25
the payroll tax rate in table 6B is less than the payroll tax rate in table 5D.) The personal income tax
rate in that year is also lower than its no-behavioral-response value.
By year 52, the personal income tax rate is reduced from 20 percent to 19 percent. The
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Table 6 EFFECT OF PHASE-IN PARTIAL PRIVATIZATION ON TAX BASE AND DWL
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C) New Personal Income Tax Allowing for Labor Supply Response
1995 20.10 20.11 20.12 20.13 20.14 20.15
2002 20.17 20.18 20.18 20.19 20.19 20.19
2009 20.19 20.18 20.17 20.16 20.14 20.12
2016 20.07 20.04 20.00 19.97 19.93
2023
19.87
19.75 19.69 19.63 19.57 19.51 19.45
2030 19.33 19.46 19.49 19.45 19.42 19.38
2037 19.31 19.27 19.24 19.21 19.17 19.14
2044 19.08 19.05 19.02 18.99 18.96 18.93
2051 18.88 18.86 18.84 18.82 18.80 18.79
2058 18.76 18.75 18.74 18.73 18.72 18.72
2065 18.71 18.70 18.70 18.70 18.70 18.69
D) Change in Deadweight Loss Due to Privatization ($ billions)
1995 3.78 4.49 5.22 6.00 6.77
2002 8.87 9.39 9.87 10.36 10.64
2009 10.60 10.32 9.75 8.37 6.90
2016 1.00 -1.63 -4.56 -7.81 -11.46
2023 -26.07 -31.24 -36.69 -42.04 -47.31
2030 -63.22 -56.17 -55.84 -59.86 -63.99
2037 -74.04 -76.53 -79.01 -81.58 -84.04
2044 -91.12 -93.53 -95.7B -97.96 -100.01
2051 -105.52 -107.00 -108.49 -109.92 -111.31
2058 -114.63 -115.43 -116.16 -116.82 -117.40
2065 -118.77 -119.12 -119.42 -119.68 -119.92
E) Change in Deadweight Loss As a Percent of Covered Wages
1995 0.13 0.15 .0.17 0.19 0.21
2002 0.27 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.30
2009 0.28 0.27 0.25 0.21 0.17
2016 0.02 -0.04 -0.11 -0.18
2023
-0.27
-0.58 -0.69 -0.80 -0.91 -1.01
2030 -1.30 -1.15 -1.12 -1.19 -1.26
2037 -1.40 -1.43 -1.46 -1.49 -1.52
2044 -1.59 -1.61 -1.63 -1.65
2051
-1.67
-1.70 -1.71 -1.71 -1.72 -1.72
2058 -1.72 -1.71 -1.70 -1.69 -1.68













































































-1.56payroll taxrate isalsoreduced byone-twentieth, from 2.6l percent to2.48 percent.
The changes in the rates of payroll tax and income tax cause corresponding changes in the
deadweight loss of the tax system. Using the traditional Harberger-Browning approximation for the
deadweight loss, the change in the deadweight loss can be written: A DWL =
0.5 E [ tz, – ?0 ] ( 1 – ~}] WL where WL is the current payroll tax base, ~ = 1 – NOand t, = 1 –
N,,
Table 6D shows the annual changes in the deadweight loss that result from the changes in net
of tax shares. The annual deadweight loss of the tax system initially rises by about $3.8 billion, an
amount equivalent to 0.13 percent of covered wages (as shown in Table 6E). At its maximum, the
increased deadweight loss is 0.30 percent of payroll (in years 11 and 12). By year 23 (2017), the
shifi to a MIRA system is reducing the deadweight. The decline in the overall deadweight loss of the
tax system rises rapidly to$50 billion in 2028, $100 billion in 2048, etc. In the final year of the
simulations, the reduced deadweight loss is 1.57 percent of covered wages.
Putting the pieces together, the analysis in Tables 5 and 6 shows that in the long run
privattiation reduces the burden on employees from a
you-go system to a mandatory MIRA contribution
12.4 percent payroll tax in the current pay-as-
of 2.04 percent of payroll (Table 5B)2Gand
reduces the deadweight loss of the income and payroll taxes by 1,57 percent of payroll (Table 6E).
The combined gain to individuals is the sum of the reduction in the cash contributions (12.4 percent –
2,05 percent = 10,35 percent of payroll) and the reduction in the deadweight loss of the tax system
2GTheactual long-run MLRA contribution is reduced from 2.04 percent of payroll to 1.94
percent of payroll because the lower marginal tax rates cause an increase in payroll income. The
correct way to compare the reduced cash tax burden (i.e,, the effect on net income) is however to
use the payroll tax rate on the initial base,
Sstran.909 30(1.57 percent of payroll) for a combined gain of 11.92 percent of payroll. The long run gain is thus
equal to almost the entire current tax paid by employers and employees and is achieved without any
reduction in the retirement benefits below what could be purchased with the current 12.4 percent
payroll tax.
In the earlier years of the transition the net effect on real disposable income (adjusted for the
change in the deadweight loss) is at fist negative and then becomes a positive gain. Thus, in the first
year there is (1) no effect on the payroll tax rate,z’ (2) a MIRA surcharge of 0.69 percent and (3) an
increased deadweight loss of 0.13 percent of payroll, The total burden rises by 0.82 percent of
payroll to 13,22 percent, By year 15, (1) the payroll tax rate is down to 11.7 percent, a decline of
0.7 percent of payroll, (2) the MIRA surcharge is 2,00 percent of payroll and (3) the deadweight
loss of the tax system is increased by 0,28 percent of payroll. The total burden rises by only 1.58
percent of payroll. But by year 25 the real disposable income is higher under the ~RA system: the
payroll tax is only 9.41 percent, the MIR4 surcharge is 2.76 percent; the combined 12,17 percent rate
implies that the deadweight loss is reduced (a reduction of 0.18 percent of payroll), implying a net
burden of 11.99 percent of payroll, Mer that the net burden falls rapidly. By year35, the combination
of the payroll tax and the MIRA surcharge is only 7.87 percent of payroll and the deadweight loss
reduction is 1,21 percent of payroll, implying a net burden of 6.66 percent of payroll and therefore
a net gain of 5,74 percent of payroll,
Looking at the aggregate gains and losses (i.e, multiplying these percentage of payroll changes
27T0calculate the change in real disposable income it is appropriate to use the tax rate that
would be applied to the original tax base (12.40 percent) rather than the tax rate that would be
applied to the slightly reduced tax base (12,46 percent). Of course, the deadweight loss
calculation does use the higher tax rate,
Sslran.909 31by the aggregate payroll) shows that the present value of the changes during the first 41 years is
positive at any real discount rate of 5 percent or less, As the horizon extends beyond41 years, the
present value of the changes becomes increasingly positive, Even with a very high real discount rate
of 7 percent, the present value of the changes is positive for any horizon of51 years or more, The
shift to a privatized plan with MIRA accounts using the transition path analyzed in this section thus
has a positive aggregate present value for all plausible discount rates and does so even if the horizon
is limited to only 51 years.
The next section discusses what happens to the individual initial age cohorts during this
transition.
5.4 The Effects of the Transition on Different Age Cohorts
The transition option that we have been analyzing is more favorable to younger employees
(and, of course, to fiture generations) than to those who are currently in middle age or near
retirement. An analysis of the distribution of gains by the current age cohorts is interesting in itself
and shows that the gains and losses cannot be redistributed among the initial generation of employees
in a way that makes everyone better off. It also shows that the present value of the losses to those
in the initial generation of employees who do lose are relatively very small.
To study this, we calculate the lifetime path of the payroll taxes, MIRA surcharges and
deadweight loss changes for a representative individual in each age cohort from age 5 to age 60.2E
28 The representative individual is someone with mean earnings for that age cohort. The
issues associated with income distribution and the redistribution of the current Social Security
program to individuals with low lifetime covered earnings are discussed in section 6 of this paper,
The changes in the deadweight losses involve the approximating assumption that all of the
change in the deadweight loss that results from the changes in the marginal tax rates faced by the
Sstran,909 32For each individual, the net gain in each year is the difference between the payroll tax (in constant
1995 dollars) that the individual would pay at the 12.4 percent rate in the current pay-as-you-go
system and the sum of the payroll tax, the MIRA surcharge and the deadweight loss change under
the MlR4 system.
Table 7 shows the resulting paths of net gains for individuals who are 25, 40 and 55 years old
in 1995, the assumed fist year of the program. Note that the 25 year olds are affected for forty years
while the 40 year olds and 55 year olds are affected for shorter periods until they retire at age 65.
During the first two decades, each of these representative individuals incurs a small loss, exceeding
two percent of payroll only for the oldest age group, When the current 25 year olds reach age 50,
they begin to have positive annual benefits.
Table 8 summarizes the actuarial present values of these annual effects of privatization on
representative individuals in each initial age cohort from 5 through 60 years old, Estimates are
presented for three different real discount rates. The common feature about all of these figures is that
they are quite small for existing employees (aged 20 through 60), indicating that the transition
generations do not pay a large price for the benefits that will accrue to future generations.
With a real discount rate of 3 percent, the initial cohort of 50 years olds incur lifetime losses
with an actuarial present value of $4,680. The lifetime gains to those who are 20 years old when
privatization begins are worth $4,420 in present value. But those who have not yet joined the labor
force can look forward to substantially larger gains: $9380 for 15 year OISand $14440 for 10 year
olds.
individual accme to that individual, While this is true when there is no preexisting tax rate, part of
the gain that results from a change in an existing tax rate accrues to the government in the form of
additional revenue. Our calculation implicitly assumes that this is returned to the individual,
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Table 7 NET GAINS FROM PHASE-IN PARTIAL PRIVATIZATION (BY COHORT)
--— -- ---— —_______ ---- --— --- -- ---- ---— --- -—-- ---- ---- ---- -——— ---- ---— -—— ____ _
Percent of Payroll
Age in 1995 = 25
1995 -0.08 -0.18 -0.28 -0.37 -0.47 -1.06 -1.15
2002 -1.25 -1.33 -1.40 -1.47 -1.51 -1.55 -1.55
2009 -1.55 -1.54 -1.50 -1.3f3 -1.25 -1.11 -0.94
2016 -0.72 -0.48 -0.21 0.08 0.42 0.90 1.35
2023 1.85 2.34 2.87 3.38 3.87 4.36 4.86
2030 5.35 4.12 3.83 4.11 4.39 0.00 0.00
Age in 1995 = 40
1995 -0.82 -0.94 -1.07 -1.19 -1.31 -1.42 -1.53
2002 -1.64 -1.73 -1.81 -1.89 -1.95 -1.99 -2.01
2009 -2.02 -2.02 -1.99 -1.89 -1.77 -1.65 -1.49
2016 -1.29 -1.07 -0.82 -0.54 0.00 0.00 0.00
Age in 1995 = 55
1995 -1.39 -1.53 -1.66 -1.79 -1.92 -2.04 -2.16
2002 -2.27 -2.36 -2.45 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
---— —_— ———- --- ---- ---- --—- —-- ---— —-—----— -——— —--- ---- --—————— —--- -——— -—-————
Table 8 ACTUARIAL PV OF NET GAINS FROM PHASE-IN PARTIW PRIVATIZATION
-——_ ____ _---- -- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----- —--- ----- ---- ---— —--- --- ---
Thousands of Dollars Per Worker Percent of Future Wages




















































































-1.87Although different phase in schedules or age related payroll taxes could change this pattern,
there is no way in which all age cohorts in the labor force at the time of privatization can be made
better off. The cumulative present value for all those age 20 to 65 at the time of privatization is
clearly negative .29
The result would however look quite different if we took the nuclear family as the unit of
observation for our analysis. Consider a couple in which the husband and wife are both aged 45 with
two children aged 10 and 15. Although the 45 year olds have a combined net present value loss of
$11,680 (at a 3 percent discount rate), this is outweighed by the children’s gains of more than
$23,000. Younger families would tend to be even bigger gainers,
5.5 Effect of a Lower Return on MIRA Contributions
Throught this section, the analysis has assumed that MIRA contributions earn a real return
equal to the fill 9 percent pre-tax marginal product of capital. To achieve this, the federal and state
governments would have to contribute to each MIRA account an amount estimated to be the
corporate taxes collected on the incremental capital represented by that account. In the current
analysis, which has ignored fluctuations in stock and bond prices, this would be about 3.6 percent of
the assets in each account.
Although a proper accounting of the effects of the Mm contributions does require
29It would of course be possible to create what appears to be a Pareto improving
privatization by combining the social security privatization with another fundamental reform (e.g.,
the shift from an income tax to a consumption tax) and distributing the gains from that reform in a
way that causes the combination of the two reforms to make everyone better off, Since the tax
reform could be done separately, the Pareto improvement cannot pro’perly be attributed to the
privatization of social security,
sstrm,909 34attributing the additional corporate tax collections to the MIRA accounts, in practice the government
may not be willing to make such a transfer and may use the increased corporate tax revenue to find
other government spending or tax reductions, It is worthwhile therefore to ask what the MIRA
contributions would have to be if the real return earned by the MIRA accounts is limited to the 5,4
percent that is net of corporate tax payments (and therefore that could be earned directly by investing
in the market mixture of equity and debt.)
The long-run effect is to raise the required MIRA contribution from 2.04 percent of payroll
to 3.31 percent of payroll, i,e., slightly less than in inverse proportion to the decline in the rate of
return, Panel 9B shows that this same almost exact inverse proportion relation holds for each year
in the transition,
Thus, even with this much reduced return, the long-run mandatory contribution is reduced
by almost three-fourths of the current 12.4 percent tax rate.
Moreover, during the transition, the combination of the payroll tax plus mandatory
contribution only rises from the current 12.4 percent to a maximum of 14.8 percent afier 14 years
(Panel 9E) and is permanently down below 12.4 percent afier 28 years.
We reiterate, however, that this is looking at the pension contributions in isolation and ignores
the favorable effect on revenue elsewhere in the system. A complete accounting requires crediting
the additional corporate tax revenue.
6. Distributional Considerations: Protecting the Poor
The method of calculating Social Security benefits in the current unfinded system is designed
to provide some redistribution from individuals with high lifetime earnings to those with low lifetime
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Table 9 PHASE-IN FROM PARTIAL TO TOTAL PRIVATIZATION AT P = 5.4%
-——_ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ---- --- -——- ---- ——-- —-— ——— _—_
A) Mandatory Individual Contributions ($ billions)
1995 34.10 38.88 43.85 49.05
2002
54.47
71.71 77.67 83.84 90.30 96.70
2009 116.57 123.46 130.07 136.09 142.28
2016 160.81 166.64 172.45 178.19 183.76
2023 183.52 183.38 183.06 182.83 1132.85
2030 183.80 184.68 186.13 187.38 188.55
2037 191.67 193.21 194.76 196.16 197.49
2044 201.72 202.97 204.24 205.49 206.86
2051 211.15 212.94 214
2058 222.37 224.28 226
2065 237.84 240.41 243
B) Mandatory Individual Contribut,
1995 1.17 1.30 1



























































55 216.11 217.52 218.97
28 228.39 230.61 232.93
06 245.78 248.58 251.44





















































































































































































































































































3.37earnings, In practice, this redistribution is attenuated and in some cases reversed because of a variety
of ways in which low income and high income individuals differ. Low wage workers generally enter
the full time labor force at an earlier age, have higher mortality rates, and are more likely to be in two-
earner families, Each of these characteristics reduces the implicit rate of return on the household’s
Social Security taxes,30 In order to prevent poverty in old age the regular Social Security program
is currently augmented by the means tested Supplemental Security Income (SS1) program. The SS1
program could of course be continued in parallel to a privatized Social Security system, a subject that
we will not pursue firther here.31
A privatized system of individual finded accounts is explicitly nonredistributive. Each
individual receives income afier age 65 based on that individual’s MIRA contributions, It is worth
stressing however that the MIRA system would make low income workers afier the transition much
better off than they would be with the current unfunded system. The reason for this is that instead
of a payroll tax of 12.4 percent they would pay a MIRA contribution of only about two percent of
payroll. They would receive the benefit of a tax cut equal to 10 percent of income.
A modification of the basic MIRA system might permit individuals with below average
earnings to make voluntary contributions, perhaps limited by the level that would provide the same
300n the relation between Social Security net transfers and income distribution, see Hurd
and Shoven (1985),
31The combination in the SS1 program of an age test in addition to a means test reduces
the problem of the work disincentive associated with means tested welfare programs for younger
workers, The SS1 means test still creates incentives to reduce saving during working years. It
also encourages low wage workers to work in the underground economy to avoid social security
payroll taxes since any resulting increase in social security benefits would be filly offset by lower
SS1 payments.
Sstran.909 36benefits that they would have gotten under the existing Social Security system. A lower income
individual who earns the equivalent of a 4 percent rate of return under the unfunded system (because
of its redistributive features) could make MIRA contributions that achieved that level of benefits and
still enjoy a substantial net tax reduction.32
Although we shall not pursue this possibility, we do want to address the question of how the
system of individual accounts could be modified in a simple way so that no individual is lefi with an
unacceptably low annuity, For this purpose, we define “unacceptably low” to mean less than half of
the average annuity. The calculations that we report in this section show that a very small tax-transfer
at retirement would be sticient to provide all retirees with at least this level of retirement annuity .33
annual
Since the size of each individual’s accumulated MIRA finds at age 65 depends on the entire
pattern of earnings from age 30 to age 65, the frequency and extent to which the m
accounts at age 65 fd below half of the mean account cannot be inferred from single cross sections
of earnings. We therefore use the Social Security New Beneficiaries Survey, a unique data set that
provides the necessary lifetime earnings histories. More specifically, the data are a sample of all
persons who began receiving Social Security retirement benefits between June 1980 and May 1981.
For each person in the sample, Social Security earnings histories are available beginning with 1951.
32A worker born in 1945 who has a dependent spouse and who earns half the median
income would receive an actuarial return of about 3,5 percent on the taxes that he and his
employer pay.
33Weare grateful to Jeffrey Liebman for making the calculations that we report in this
section. The current analysis does not deal with differences in rates of return that different
individuals in the same age cohort would earn on their savings, To the extent that this reflects
voluntary decisions to hold different types of portfolios because of differences in risk preferences,
it may not be appropriate to compensate individuals with low outcomes (other than through the
means tested SS1 program), We return to the subject of return uncertainty in the next section of
this paper,
Sstran.909 37Since most people in the sample were between 32 and 36 in 1951 (88 percent of the sample were
born between 1915 and 1919), we assumed that the real earnings between age 30 and the age in 1951
were the same as the actual earnings in 1951, All nominal dollar amounts are restated to 1996 dollars
by using the CPI, Since the rate of MIRA contributions varies over time during the transition, we do
our calculation for the long-run value of the annual MIRA contributions as shown in Table SD, i.e.,
2.04 percent of the amount of earnings up to the annual Social Security maximum covered earnings,
Among men who retired in 1980-81, MIRA contributions of 2.04 percent of their earnings
from age 30 would have accumulated (at a 9 percent real rate of return) to a mean value of $82,985
in 1981 at the 1996 price level.34Approximately 19 percent of such accumulated MIRA accounts had
less than half of this amount. The average short-fd among these accounts, i.e., the amount that must
be added to these accounts to bring them up to half of the mean account, was $3,889.35 The
aggregate amount of this shortfall is thus equivalent to only 4.7 percent of the total of all MIRA
accounts at age 65. This implies that increasing each MIRA contribution by 4.7 percent, i,e., from
the 2.04 percent of covered earnings reported as the long-inn value in Table 5E to 2,14 percent of
covered earnings and then levying a “tN’ of 4.7 percent on all accounts at age 65 would provide the
finds to preclude any account from having less than half of the mean account while keeping the mean
34T0put this number in perspective, note that with a 9 percent real return such an
accumulated amount would produce an annuity of about $9,950 a year. For comparison, the
average annual Social Security benefit in 1980 (in 1996 dollars) of a retired worker was $7795
and of a retired worker and wife was $12928.
35 There are two reasons why this overstates the cost of assuring that everyone has a find
equal to at least half of the mean find. First, many of the low Social Security individuals would
now be eligible for Supplemental Security Income benefits which would help to defray the cost of
increasing the find. Second, many of those with low social security earnings are individuals who
had spent most of their careers in the Federal government or in state governments that provide
pensions and remain outside the Social Security system.
Sstrar,909 38net-of-tax annuity equal to the level of Social Security benefits projected in current law (with the
solvency correction described above.)3b
This calculation of an additional 0.10 percent of payroll M3RA contribution and the associated
tax on the accumulated accounts assumes that levying the tax and providing the transfer would not
alter individuals’ incentives to earn. Even if this had to be adjusted because of incentive effects, the
implication is clear that “unacceptably low” accumulations can be avoided with a relatively small tax
and transfer, The distributional issue, judged in this way, need not be an impediment to privatized
individual MIRA accounts,
7. Risk: Uncertain Returns and Imperfect Annuity Markets
Until now we have ignored the problem that finded MIRA accounts involve risky
investments. Of course, the current unfinded pay-as-you-go system is also risky, although in a very
different way. Despite the reforms of 1983, it is clear that the existing system cannot pay the
“promised’ benefits, Many younger persons say that they believe that Social Security benefits will not
be there when they retire. Legislative proposals involve reducing all benefits, taxing benefits of higher
income recipients, and other changes that would reduce the real value of the benefits for some
individuals very substantially, This section focuses on the risks of the finded MIRA accounts and asks
how (and at what costs) individuals could be protected from such risks.
~bThiscalculation is based on the earnings of men only, even in two earner couples,
Applying the same method of accumulation to the earnings of husbands and wives in a pooled
account leads to similar conclusions. The mean accumulated MIRA account based on 2.04
percent of husbands and wives earnings was $104,511 in 1986 dollars. Only 19.2 percent of
MIRA accounts had less than half of this total with a mean shortfall of $4204, corresponding to a
4.2 percent tax on accumulated accounts.
Sstran.909 39Although the real pretax return on the nonfinancial corporate capital stock has averaged
somewhat more than nine percent since 1960, there are substantial year-to-year fluctuations in the
return earned by portfolio investors. If MIRA contributions are based on the expected 9 percent
return (as in the calculations of section 5 above), an individual who is fortunate to save and contribute
to a MIRA account during years when the stock and bond markets are relatively low and to retire and
dissave when those markets are relatively high will enjoy a level of benefits greater than those
provided by the pay-as-you-go Social Security system (as well as having paid a much lower cost of
financing that benefit,) Conversely, an individual who
relatively low will receive annuity payments that are less
retires when the level of stock prices is
than those provided by the pay-as-you-go
system if the MIRA contributions are based on an assumed 9 percent return.
The Metime return in a MIR4 account that is invested in the market’s debt-equity mixture is
almost certain to exceed the return in the pay-as-you-go utinded Social Security system,37
Nevertheless, the existing variability of returns does mean that an individual who contributes on the
basis of an expected 9 percent return could have very much lower retirement income if the ex post
return is substantially lower.
This market fluctuation risk is compounded by the inability to purchase actuarially fair
variable annuities based on the return earned by the market’s debt-equity mixture. Without such an
annuity, an individual must save enough to finance more than the total benefits that he expects to
37Thisis similar to the conclusion of MacCurdy and Shoven (1992) that individuals who
invested in equities are almost certain to receive a higher rate of return than those who invested in
bonds or money market instruments. They show that lifetime equity returns have been better than
debt return for individuals who began their life cycle saving in every year for more than three
quarters of a century The MacCurdy and Shoven analysis takes the amount of saving as given
and shows that the equity returns have dominated in the past. That is, of course, separate from the
question of how much an individual should save,
Sslran,909 40receive or must accept the risk of a much reduced level of consumption if he lives more than the
normal life expectancy. Although the life expectancy for men at age 65 is now nearly 16 years, 33
percent of 65 year old men live more than an additional 20 years and 5 percent live more than 30
years
Although the introduction of a universal system of m accounts might lead to market
innovations that ameliorate the market risk (e.g,, the availability of long-term put options) and the
annuity risk (e.g,, the availability of actuarially fair variable annuities) , we have explored how the
MIRA program might be adjusted in the current institutional context in which such products are not
available. Our approach does not seek an optimal adjustment of the MIRA program to the risks that
we have identified. Lnstead,we have imposed a very demanding requirement on the m accounts
by asking the following question:
In the absence of any annuity and given the historic market uncertainty of
returns on debt and equity, how much would individuals have to contribute
to MIRA accounts to be able to receive the baseline level of Social Security
benefits with probability 0.95 even if they might live to age 100?
Individuals who will receive some pay-as-you-go Social Security benefits during the
transition are partially protected from these risks. To focus on the maximum risk that will eventually
be faced by those who are wholly dependent on MIRA accounts for their retirement income,38 we
examine the problem for individuals who reach age 30 afier the phase-in is completed and who
therefore will receive no pay-as-you-go benefits when they have retired, We show in this section that
381ndividuals could of course continue to have private pensions, volunta~ IRAs and
volunta~ 401 k accounts. By being “wholly dependent” on the MIRA account we mean only that
they will not receive any unfinded Social Security benefits.
sstran.909 41such individuals can achieve, with 95 percent probability, benehts equal to baseline Social Security
benefits even if they may live to 100 by contributing as if they expect a rate of return that is 6.7
percent instead of 9.0 percent. This in turn implies that in the long-run the average MIRA
contributions are approximately 2.74 percent of payroll instead of the 2,04 percent of payroll implied
by the 9 percent expected rate of return (as shown in Table 5D),
Raising the average MIRA contributions in this way implies that individuals will generally die
with substantial balances in their MIRA accounts. Since the extra MIRA contributions are returned
to the next generation as either private bequests or as tax revenues (if bequests from the MIRA
accounts are not permitted and are taxed at death), the extra MIRA contributions are not really an
increased cost of privatization. In exchange for the resulting bequests, the subsequent generation
might agree to reinsure the individuals against the “5 percent” risk that the combination of poor
average stock and bond market petiormance for their age cohort and above average longevity of the
individual causes finds to be exhausted, This might be formalized by a government reinsurance
arrangement. Such possibilities will not be explored firther in this paper. Instead, we now describe
the calculations that show that raising the average MIRA contributions fiom2,04 percent of payroll
to 2.74 percent is sufficient to fund the baseline level of Social Security benefits with 95 percent
probability,
To describe the evolution of an individual’s MIRA account, we use the following notation:
M(t) is the market value of the individual’s MIRA account in year t; Q(t) is the ratio of the market
value of a market-weighted mixture of debt and equity to the real value of the underlying capital
stock; S(t) is the individual’s MIRA contribution in year t; and K(t) is the real value of the assets in
the MIRA account, i.e., M(t)= Q(t) x K(t).
sslran.909 42We assume the following simplified picture of the real return on these assets. Each dollar of
real capital yields a real return of 9 percent. 39The government takes 3,5 percent of this in corporate
taxes. Real dividends and interest are 3.0 percent, leaving retained earnings of 2.5 percent of capital.
The real capital stock in the individual’s MIRA account grows because of the retained earnings and
because of the investment of dividends, interest, corporate tax rebates and new MLRA contributions.
Although the retained earnings add dollar for dollar to the real capital stock, the amount of real
capital purchased by the other external investments depends on the level of Q(t). Thus the real capital
stock in the MIRA evolves during the preretirement years according to:
(1) K(t+l) = 1.025 K(t)+ 0.065 K(t)/Q(t) + S(t+l )/Q(t+ 1)
and the corresponding market value of the capital stock is
(2) M(t+l) = Q(t+l) [1,025 K(t)] + 0.065 Q(t+l) K(t)/ Q(t)+ S(t+l)
Mer retirement, the annual contributions cease and the market value of the capital stock is
reduced by withdrawing the baseline benefits [B(t)] according to
(3) M(t+l) = Q(t+l) [1,025 K(t)] + 0.065 Q(t+l) K(t)/ Q(t) - B(t+l)
This is a stochastic relationship because Q(t) varies randomly from year to year. We have
estimated the following autoregressive equation with data on Q(t) for 1947 to 1994.40
(4) In Q(t)= -0.015 + 0.920 in Q(t-1) + u(t)
(0.041) (0.067)
with ~ ~= O,18, Although this specification implies regression
significantly different from those of a random walk. Moreover,
to the mean, the coefficients are not
at the mean value of Q(t) = 0,69 for
39Weignore the fluctuations -in is the real return on capital and focus on the much larger
fluctuations -in is the market value of the assets.
40The data for this equation are presented -in is Poterba and Samwick (1995).
Sstran.909 43the sample period, the equation approximates the random walk: in Q(t) -In Q(t-1) = u(t).’]
Combining equations (2), (3) and (4), we simulate the time path of M(t) for someone who
starts contributing to the MIRA at age 30, works until age 65 and then dissaves the Social Security
baseline benefits from age 65 until death. We repeat the simulation 1000 times and note the fraction
of times that the individual still has positive MIRA assets at death, Using the saving rates implied by
the 9 percent rate of return implies that individuals die with positive assets in 80 percent of the
simulations but exhaust their assets in the other 20 percent. Reducing the assumed rate of return used
to calculate each year’s required MIRA contribution from 9 percent to 6.7 percent raises the fraction
of the time that individuals die with assets to 95 percent.42 Repeating the calculations of Table 5
shows that a 6,7 percent assumed rate of return on MIRA contributions raises the required
contributions from 2.04 percent of payroll to 2,74 percent of payroll. As already noted, the extra
70 basis points of tax are not really an extra burden since these additional MIRA savings are returned
to the next generation as bequests or in the form of lower taxes.
‘]Using this random walk formulation and recognizing that the u(t)’s are serially
independent implies that the variance of in Q(t) – in Q(t-s) is s x d” where d” is the variance
of the disturbance u. If individuals did all of their saving at age 45 and then dissaved it at age 75,
the variance of the relative level of Q(t) at age 75 relative to its level at age 45 would be 3Od.
With d.= 0.0324 (as observed -in is the data for 1947 through 1994), this implies that the
variance of the logarithm of the level of Q(t) at age 75 relative to this value at age 45 would be
about 1 and therefore that its standard deviation would also be about 1, If the expected rise -in is
the value of the saving from age 45 to age 75 is (1.09)30= 13.3, the one standard deviation range
is from 13.3 e-] = 13.3/ 2.72 = 4.89 to 13.3 e = 36.18. Ninety-five percent of the probability
distribution lies above the mean minus 1.64 standard errors or 13,3 e-la= 2,58, Note that this
substantially exceeds the value implied by the PAYGO return of 2 percent per year or (1,02)30 =
1,81, The actual risk characteristic is more complex and less extreme because saving and
dissaving are done over many years and not at just two points -in is time,
42Reducing the assumed rate of return to 5.2 percent rates the fraction who die with assets
99 percent.
Sstran.909 44In concluding this discussion of risk, we reiterate that this calculation is not presented as an
optimal response to the market risk and annuity risk but is intended to show that even maintaining
the fill baseline benefits can be achieved with a relatively small increase in the MIRA contributions
that still leaves the MIRA contributions less than one fourth of the existing 12.4 percent payroll tax.43
8. An Alternative Baseline for Social Security : Modifying the Inflation Indexing
For the simulation in sections 5 through 7, the benefits correspond to the formula in the
existing Social Security law until the trust find is exhausted in is 2030 and then drop sharply to the
level of benefits that can be financed with the 12.4 percent payroll tax. This sharp drop in benefits
in the year 2030 is the simplest case to analyze but it is not the most realistic. A more plausible
assumption is that, whether or not Social Security is privatized, the growth of benefits will be reduced
gradually by reducing the annual inflation indexing of benefits.44
Reducing the annual indexing of benefits by one percentage point causes the aggregate level
of Social Security benefits to decline eventually by about 9 percent. The decline does not continue
beyond this level because the modification of indexing only affects post-retirement benefits and not
the level of benefits of new retirees.
430ne plausible modification would reduce benefits -in is year t to Q(t) times the basic
benefit if 0,7< Q(T) <1.0 and to 0.7 times the basic benefit if Q(t) <0.7. -in is this case, MIR4
contributions calculated by assuming a 7.3 percent rate of return will generate enough
contributions to cause 95 percent of the simulations to end with positive assets, This implies an
average MIRA contribution of 2.53 percent of payroll (instead of the 2.04 percent of payroll with
no uncertainty and 2.74 percent with the uncertain but inflexible benefits).
44The Senate Finance Committee has appointed an Expert Committee to consider how the
indexing of Social Security benefits should be modified to be consistent with the true increase -in
is the cost of living, See Boskin et, al. (1996). For an earlier advocacy of such an inflation
adjustment, see Feldstein andFeldstein(1984),
Sstran.909 45The effect of this temporarily lower rate of growth of Social Security benefits depends on
how the resulting finds are used. We assume that the path of the trust find is kept unchanged and
therefore that the payroll tax is reduced. This makes the transition to the MIRA system more
attractive to the initial generation of employees as well as reducing the relative magnitude of the
benefit reduction in 2030 when the trust find is exhausted.
Table 10A shows the percentage reduction in benefits that results from the one percentage
point adjustment to the indexing. At the end of seven years, aggregate benefits are 4.64 percent lower
and at the end of21 years they are 7,97 percent lower. Mer 2030 the benefit reduction is the same
relative to existing law as we showed in Table 4.45
Table 11 presents our standard analysis of the time path of payroll taxes and MIRA surcharges
for the policy of adjusting retiree benefits by one percent less than the increase in the consumer price
index, Since fiture benefits (before 203 O)will be lower than they would be with fill CPI indexing,
the required MIRA contributions and required payroll tax are smaller than they would otherwise be.
Since this tiects only the transition before 2030, in the very long run the tax and W contributions
are essentially unchanged from the case of fill indexing. Table 12 shows the analogous calculations
of the resulting shifi in labor supply and the change in the deadweight loss of the payroll tax.
Perhaps most interesting are the disaggregated analyses for representative individuals that are
presented in tables 13 and 14. With this CPI-minus-one adjustment of benefits, the actuarial present
value of the change in real disposable income is positive for all current individuals who are below the
age of 30, The present value losses for those who are older are substantially less than they are with
45Wediscontinue the indexing adjustment afier the benefit reduction in 2030
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Table 10 PARTIAL INDEXATION: TRUST FUND AND SOLVENCY ADJUSTMENT
--—- ---- —-—- ---- ---— —-—_ ____ ____ ___ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ___ ___
















































































































328.37 331.96 335.80 339.86 344.38 349.46
360.42 366.48 372.70 381.08 389.75 399.07
417.45 429.85 443.82 457.78 471.76
519.41
486.14
536.21 553.01 569.96 586.60
634.72
602.57
650.75 663.78 676.68 689.63 702.59
650.54 610.86 618.42 626.08 633.82 641.62
657.49 665.57 673.74 681.55 689.46 697.45
713.70 721.63 729.64 737.74 745.93 754.21
770.62 778.96 787.39 795.91 804.53 813.25
830.96 839.96 849.13 858.40 867.76 877.23
896.41 906.12 915.93 925.85 935.88 946.02--- --- -- -- -- -- ---- ———- --—- —— -- —.—— —--- ---— _—__
Table 11 PHASE-IN PARTIAL PRIVATIZATION (PARTIAL INDEXATION)
--- _—— ———__—__ ---- ---- -——— ——__ ———_ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ___ ____ _
A) Mandatory Individual Contributions ($ billions)
1995 19.01 21.76 24.69 27.82 31.14
2002 42.02 45.92 50.03 54.41
2009
58.81
72.76 77.72 82.59 86.83 91.26
2016 104.57 108.77 112.87 116.81 120.44
2023 119.75 119.37 118.68 117.98 117.50
2030 116.82 117.11 118.10 118.88 119.58
2037 121.17 122.29 123.42 124.33 125.21
2044 127.96 128.60 129.28 129.89 130.58
2051 132.69 133.78 134.61 135.35 135.87
2058 137.91 138.89 139.94 141.10 142.35
2065 146.67 148.27 149.94 151.68 153.49
B) Mandatory Individual Contributions (Percent of Payroll)
1995 0.65 0.73 0.81 0.90 0.99
2002 1.26 1.35 1.45 1.55 1.65
2009 1.94 2.04 2.14 2.22 2.30
2016 2.53 2.60 2.67 2.73 2.79
2023 2.68 2.64 2.60 2.55 2.51
2030 2.41 2.39 2.38 2.36 2.35
2037 2.29 2.29 2.28 2.27 2.26
2044 2.23 2.22 2.20 2.19 2.18
2051 2.14 2.14 2.13 2.11 2.10
2058 2.06 2.06 2.05 2.04 2.04
2065 2.03 2.03 2.04 2.04 2.04
C) Benefits Replaced Due to Privatization ($ billions)
1995 0.00 0.13 0.38 0.78 1.34
2002 4.44 6.10 8.08 10.37 13.21
2009 25.12 30.15 35.99 43.66 51.86
2016 81.72 93.74 106.84 121.06 136.64
2023 188.59 207.61 227.96 248.15 268.62
2030 334.04 310.24 303.98 320.95 338.42
2037 393.42 411.53 430.08 449.32 468.52
2044 527.69 548.06 568.03 587.98 607.72
2051 664.97 682.81 700.46 717.66 734.44
2058 780.86 795.15 808.95 822.37 835.40
2065 872.55 884.37 896.00 907.47 918.83
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Table 12 EFFECT OF PHASE-IN PARTIAL PRIVATIZATION ON TAX BASE AND DWL
PARTIAL INDEXATION AND SOLVENCY ADJUSTMENT
-----—— -—--- ----- --—— —- --- ---- ——-- ---- ———- --—— ——-- ---— —--- —--- --- --—— --— ———
A) Payroll Tax Needed to Maintain Trust Fund With No Behavioral Response (llD)
1995 12.40 12.29 12.19 12.09 11.98
2002 11.68 11.57 11.47 11.36 11.24
2009 10.83 10.68 10.50 10.30 10.09
2016 9.35 9.06 8.75 8.42 8.07
2023 6.93 6.53 6.10 5.70 5.30
2030 4.06 6.02 6.23 5.96 5.70
2037 4.89 4.64 4.39 4.13 3.88
2044 3.13 2.I38 2.64 2.41 2.19
2051 1.58 1.41 1.25 1.10 0.96
2058 0.62 0.53 0.46 0.39 0.33
2065 0.20 0.17 0.14 0.11 0.09
B) New Payroll Tax Rate Allowing for Labor Supply Response
1995 12.46 12.35 12.24 12.14 12.03
2002 11.72 11.62 11.51 11.40 11.27
2009 10.86 10.70 10.52 10.31 10.09
2016 9.32 9.01 8.69 8.34 7.98
2023 6.80 6.38 5.95 5.54 5.14
2030 3.89 5.86 6.07 5.80 5.53
2037 4.72 4.47 4.22 3.96 3.71
2044 2.98 2.74 2.51 2.28 2.07
2051 1.49 1.33 1.17 1.03 0.90
2058 0.58 0.50 0.43 0.36 0.31























C) New Personal Income Tax Allowing for Labor Supply Response
1995 20.09 20.09 20.08 20.08 20.08 20.08
2002 20.08 20.07 20.07 20.07 20.07 20.06
2009 20.05 20.04 20.03 20.02 20.00 19.98
2016 19.93 19.90 19.86 19.83 19.79 19.73
2023 19.62 19.56 19.50 19.44 19.39 19.33
2030 19.22 19.46 19.49 19.45 19.42 19.38
2037 19.31 19.27 19.24 19.21 19.17 19.14
2044 19.08 19.05 19.02 18.99 18.96 18.93
2051 10.88 18.86 18.84 18.!32 18.80 18.79
2058 18.76 18.75 18.74 18.73 18.72 18.72
2065 18.71 18.70 18.70 18.70 18.70 18.69
D) Change in Deadweight Loss Due to Privatization ($ billions)
1995 3.46 3.35 3.28 3.27 3.29
2002 3.31 3.22 3.13 3.08 2.86
2009 1.64 1.05 0.15 -1.33 -2.91
2016 -8.99 -11.64 -14.55 -17.73 -21.27
2023 -35.29 -40.25 -45.46 -50.53 -55.55
2030 -70.71 -56.17 -55.84 -59.86 -63.99
2037 -74.04 -76.53 -79.01 -81.58 -84.04
2044 -91,12 -93.53 -95.78 -97.96 -100.01
2051 -105.52 -107.00 -108.49 -109.92 -111.31
2058 -114.63 -115.43 -116.16 -116.82 -117.40
2065 -118.77 -119.12 -119.42 -119.68 -119.92
E) Change in Deadweight Loss As a Percent of Covered Wages
1995 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10
2002 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08
2009 0.04 0.03 0.00 -0.03
2016 -0.22
-0.07
-0.28 -0.34 -0.42 -0.49
2023 -0.79 -0.89 -0.99 -1.09 -1.19
2030 -1.46 -1.15 -1.12 -1.19 -1.26
2037 -1.40 -1.43 -1.46 -1.49 -1.52
2044 -1.59 -1.61 -1.63 -1.65 -1.67
2051 -1.70 -1.71 -1.71 -1.72 -1.72
2058 -1.72 -1.71 -1.70 -1.69 -1.68
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Table 13 NET GAINS FROM PHASE-IN PARTIAL PRIVATIZATION (BY COHORT)
PARTIAL INDEXATION AND SOLVENCY ADJUSTMENT
-—- ---- ——-— —--- —-—— —--- ——_— ____ __
Percent of Payroll
Age in 1995 = 25
1995 -0.02 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.08 -0.42
2002
-0.42
-0.43 -0.44 -0.44 -0.45 -0.44 -0.43





1.04 1.33 1.66 2.12
2023 3.05 3.54
2.57
4.05 4.54 5.02 5.49
2030 6.44
5.97
4.12 3.83 4.11 4.39 0.00 0.00
Age in 1995 = 40
1995 -0.76 -0.76 -0.76 -0.76 -0.77 -0.79





-0.86 -0.83 -0.77 -0.66 -0.54 -0.41
2016
-0.26
-0.06 0.16 ‘0.41 0.69 0.00 0.00 0.00
Age in 1995 = 55
1995 -1.34 -1.34 -1.35 -1.37 -1.39 -1.42
2002
-1.44
-1.47 -1.50 -1.52 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
-——-——-— ———— ——— ---- ---— ———— ———— ———_ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ___ ___ ____ ___
Table 14 ACTUARIAL PV OF NET GAINS FROM PWE-IN PARTIAL PRIVATIZATION
PARTIAL INDEXATION AND SOLVENCY ADJUSTMENT
-—-- ---- ---- ---- ---- -—__ ___ ___ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ __
Thousands of Dollars Per Worker Percent of Future Wages




















































































-1.60no benefit adjustment before 2030.46 The maximum loss occurs for 45 year olds and, at a 3 percent
real discount rate, the loss for a couple is $6560. If they have two children aged 10 and 15, the net
gain for the nuclear family would be more than $25,000,
9. Maintaining Current Law Benefits
Our final analysis deals with the possibility of maintaining the level of benefits specified by
current law The fiture insolvency of the existing Social Security system will force a reduction in
benefits unless taxes are raised dramatically or a much higher return is earned on individual
contributions. Unlike the previous sections of this paper, we now explore the role of the MIRA
system if the level of benefits implied by current law is to be maintained.
Tables 3 and 4 showed that, with the current pay-as-you-go system, the Trust Fund is
projected to be exhausted in 2030 (Table 3B) and that benefits must be reduced by 24 percent in
2032 if they are to be financed by the revenue prodcued by a 12.4 percent tax. The benefit reduction
consistent with a 12.4 percent tax rises to 35 percent by the last year of the projections (2071). These
numbers imply that maintaining the level of benefits implied by current law would require raising the
tax by 31 percent in 2032 (from 12.4 percent to 16.3 percent) and then continuing to raise the tax
rate, reaching 19.1 percent in 2071.47
4GOfcourse, these individuals will receive lower benefits at retirement than under current
law. But that is common to the pay-as-you-go and privatized systems if the CPI adjustment will
be adopted in either case.
47Thiscalculation ignores the effect of the higher tax rate on labor supply and taxable
income, Because the shifi from a 12,4 percent tax rate to a 19.1 percent tax rate would reduce
taxable income, a higher rate would be necessary to offset the resulting reduction in payroll and
income tax revenue.
Ssiran 909 47The MIRA system would permit benefits to be maintained at the level provided by current law
with a long-inn MIRA contribution rate of only 3.15 percent (instead of the 2.04 percent required
to finance the level of benefits that would result from maintaining the 12,4 percent payroll tax). Thus
the MIRA contributions rise in approximately the same proportion as the payroll tax would have to
rise (from 12.4 percent to 19,1 percent) but the level is dramatically lower.
Table 15 presents our usual analysis of the transition path, It is particularly noteworthy that
the W contributions (and the combined payroll tax plus MIRA contributions) during the first two
decades differ little from the baseline case (presented in Table 5) that corresponds to the eventual
sharp beneht reductions. In is the tenth year, for example, the combined payroll tax plus m
contribution is 13.87 percent versus the 13,71 percent in the baseline case. This is not surprising
since in these early years most employees need make little provision for the benefits to be received
after 2030.
10. Summary and Questions for Future Research
The analysis in this paper has convinced the authors that the transition to a filly privatized
system of individual retirement accounts can be done in a way that conveys a very substantial long-
run benefit and that has relatively modest transition costs. The longer-term benefits would exceed 5
percent of GDP every year, Younger employees at the time of the transition would be net gainers in
their own working lives, The net extra costs incurred by older employees during the transition would
be very small and would generally be more than offsetby the positive net benefits that their own
children would receive. For the first fifiy years of the transition taken as a whole, the present value
of net gains would be positive for any reasonable rate of interest.
Sstran.909 48Table 15 PHASE-IN FROM PARTIAL TO TOTAL PRIVATIZATION
WITH CURRENT LAW BENEFITS
A) Mandatory Individual Contributions ($ billions)
1995 21.09 24.19 27.52 31.09 34.91
2002 47.55 52.14 57.01 62.24 67.55
2009 84.74 90.97 97.18 102.82 108.77
2016 127.32 133.46 139.63 145.75 151.66
2023 155.13 156.10 156.69 157.20 157.91
2030 160.20 161.29 163.28 165.02 166.68
2037 171.25 173.61 176.00 178.13 180.24
2044 186.72 188.51 190.33 192.04 193.85
2051 199.16 201.40 203.24 204.91 206.23
2058 210.62 212.44 214.34 216.37 218.52
2065 225.63 228.19 230.85 233.59 236.41
B) Mandatory Individual Contributions (Percent of Payroll)
1995 0.72 0.81 0.91 1.00 1.11
2002 1.43 1.54 1.65 1.77 1.89
2009 2.26 2.39 2.51 2.62 2.74
2016 3.08 3.20 3.31 3.41 3.51
2023 3.47 3.45 3.43 3.40 3.38
2030 3.31 3.29 3.29 3.2I3 3.28
2037 3.24 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25
2044 3.26 3.25 3.24 3.24 3.23
2051 3.21 3.22 3.21 3.20 3.19
2058 3.15 3.14 3.14 3.13 3.13
2065 3.13 3.13 3.13 3.14 3.14
C) Benefits Replaced Due to Privatization ($ billions)
1995 0.00 0.13 0.38 0.78 1.35
2002 4.52 6.22 8.25 10.62 13.57
2009 25.93 31.17 37.29 45.26 53.82
2016 85.18 97.86 111.70 126.74 143.23
2023 198.55 218.93 240.74 262.44 284.59
2030 355.89 378.74 400.58 423.54 447.27
2037 517.57 539.62 562.21 585.79 609.89
2044 686.31 713.69 742.02 770.99 800.25
2051 891.33 922.29 954.19 986.44 1019.23
2058 1115.19 1146.31 1177.25 1206.22 1234.25


























































































































































































































































-3.46Our research has suggested a variety of issues that deserve firther attention, One important
issue is the treatment of couples, including the special problems caused by divorce and remarriage.
In principle this should be easier to deal with in a system of individual accounts but this deserves
detailed analysis.
The role of survivor benefits and disability benefits should also be considered more explicitly.
How can these be provided in a way that captures the potential real return on the market
equity and debt? How would permitting bequests affect the economics of the program?
mix of
Although our calculations indicate that a small tax-based redistribution of MIRA assets at age
65 can prevent poverty in old age, it would be good to examine this and other distributional issues
in more detail.
The potential long-run gain from pnvatizing Social Security implies that firther research on
these issues deserves a very high priority.
Cambridge, MA and Hanover, NH
September 1996
Sstran,909 49References
Adviso~ Council on Social Security, C)uadrennial Reuo~, fofihco~ng 1996.
Auerbach, Alan and Laurence Kotlikoff. Dynamic Fiscal Policv, Cambridge, England: Cambridge
University Press, 1987.
Auten, Gerald and R. Carroll. “Taxpayer Behavior and the 1986 Tax Reform Act,” Treasury
Department OffIce of Tax Analysis, July 1994.
Board of Trustees, Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Trust Funds, Annual
~n, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995.
Boskin, Michael, Laurence Kotlikoff, Douglas Puffert and John Shoven. “Social Security: A
Financial Appraisal Across and Within Generations,” National Tax Journal, 40, 1987, pp 19.
34.
Boskin, Michael et al Preliminam Ret)ort to Senate Finance Committee 1996
Browning, Edgar. “On the Marginal Welfare Cost of Taxation,” American Economic Review,
March 1987, pp 11-23.
Bureau of the Census, “U, S. Population Estimates by Age, Sex, Race and Hispanic Origin: 1990 to
1995,” (machine-readable data file) 1996a.
Bureau of the Census, “Population Projections of the United States by Age, Sex, Race and Hispanic
Origin: 1995 to 2050 (Vital Rate Inputs),” (machine-readable data file) 1996b,
Economic ReDort of the President, 1996.
Feldstei~ Marth. “Should Social Security be Means Tested?” Journal of Political Economv, 95(3),
June 1987, pp 468-484.
Feldstei~ Martin. “Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the Income Tax,” NBER Working
Paper No. 5055, March 1995a.
Feldstein, Martin. “The Effect of Marginal Tax Rates on Taxable Income: A Panel Study of the
1986 Tax Reform Act,” Journal of Political Economy, (103 :3), June 1995b, pp 551-72.
Feldstein, Martin. “Would Privatizing Social Security Raise Economic Welfare?” NBER Working
Paper No. 5281, 1995c,
Sstran.909 50Feldsteiq Martin. “The Missing Piece -in is Policy Analysis: Social Security Reform,” The Richard
T, Ely Lecture, American Economic Review, Vol. 86, No. 2, May 1996, pp 1-14,
Feldstein, Martin, Louis Dicks-Mireaux and James Poterba. “The Effective Tax Rate and the
Pretax Rate of Return,” Journal of Public Economics, 21(2), July 1983, pp 129-158.
Feldstein, Martin and Kathleen Feldstein (1984) “Time for a Threshold,” Boston Globe, Nov 27th
1984.
Feldstein, Martin and Andrew Samwick, “Social Security Rules and Marginal Tax Rates, ”
National Tax Journal, Vol. 45, No. 1, March, 1992, pp 1-22.
Harberger, Arnold. “Taxation, Resource Allocation, and Welfwe,” in J. Due (cd.), The Role
of Direct and Indirect Taxe s -in is the Federal Revenue Svstem, Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1964.
Hurd, Michael and John Shoven (1985) “The Distributional Impact of Social Security,” in D.
Wise Pensions. Labor and Individual Choice, Chicago: Chicago University Press
Kotlikoff, Laurence. “Privatization of Social Security: How It Works and Why It Matters,” in
James Poterba (cd.), Tax Policv and the Economv, 1996.
Kotlikoff, Laurence, “Simulating the Privatization of Social Security in General Equilibrium,”
in Martin Feldstein, Privatizin~ Social Securitv, forthcoming, 1996.
MacCurdy, Thomas and John Shoven (1992) “Stocks, Bonds and Pension Wealth,” in David Wise
Touics -in is the Economics of A~ing Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Poterba, James and Andrew Samwick, “Stock Ownership Patterns, Stock Market Fluctuations,
and Consumption,” Brookin~s Par)ers on Economic Activitv, 2:1995, pp 295-357.
Rippe, Richard. “Further Gains in Corporate Profitability,” Economic Outlook MonthIv, ~
Securities, Inc., August 1995.
Samuelson, Paul. “An Exact Consumption Loan Model of Interest With or Without the Social
Contrivance of Money,” Journal of Political Economy, 1958,
Social Security Administration, Social Securitv Bulletin Annual Statistical Supplement,
Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995.
World Bank, Averting the Old Age Crisis: Policies to Protect the Old and Promote Growth,
Policy Research Report Series, Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press for the
World Bank, 1994.
Sslran.909 51